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Abstract
Unsolicited e-mail has brought much annoyance to users, thus, making e-mail less reliable as a
communication tool. This has happened because current email architecture has key limitations.
For instance, while it allows senders to send as many messages as they want, it does not provide
adequate capability to recipients to prevent unrestricted access to their mailbox. This research
develops a new approach to equip recipients with ability to control access to their mailbox.
This thesis builds an ownership-based approach to control mailbox usage employing the Cy-
berOrgs model. CyberOrgs is a model that provides facilities to control resources in multi-agent
systems. We consider a mailbox to be a precious resource of its owner. Any access to the resource
requires its owner’s permission. Thus, we give recipients a capability to manage their valuable re-
source - mailbox. In our approach, message senders obtain a permission to send messages through
negotiation. In this negotiation, a sender makes a proposal and the intended recipient evaluates the
proposal according to their own policies. A sender’s desired outcome of a negotiation is a contract,
which conducts the subsequent communication between the sender and the recipient. Contracts
help senders and recipients construct a long-term relationship.
Besides allowing individuals to control their mailbox, we consider groups, which represent or-
ganizations in human society, in order to allow organizations to manage their resources including
mailboxes, message sending allowances, and contracts.
A prototype based on our approach is implemented. In the prototype, policies are separated
from the mechanisms. Examples of policies are presented and a public policy interface is exposed
to allow programmers to develop custom policies. Experimental results demonstrate that the sys-
tem performance is policy-dependent. In other words, as long as policies are carefully designed,
communication involving negotiation has minimal overhead compared to communication in which
senders deliver messages to recipients directly.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Email has brought many benefits to users; however unsolicited or unwanted bulk email creates
an onerous burden for both legitimate users and Email Service Providers (ESPs), which include
consumer Internet Service Providers (ISPs), (such as AOL and Telus), free ESPs (such as Gmail and
Hotmail), and organizations (such as governments, universities, and companies). Rampant unso-
licited bulk email affects every Internet user so that email has become an unreliable communication
mechanism, and Internet users are losing their trust on email even the Internet [10]. Spam research
is becoming an important research area lately and is attracting significant interest, including from
researchers and developers.
1.1 Spam
There are various informal spam definitions. [60] defines spam as email which advertises products.
In [46], spam has characteristics that a huge number of copies of the same message are sent to
recipients who would not be willing to receive it. [52] defines spam as “unsolicited bulk email.”
“Bulk email” means a large volume of email including the same content. This definition considers a
message as spam if and only if two conditions are satisfied: the message is unsolicited and it is bulk.
“Unsolicited” email may not always be spam. For example, an email containing a customer’s bill
information from a credit card company is not spam. Similarly, “bulk” email may not always be
spam either. For instance, bulk email sent from a mailing list to its subscribers is not spam. In this
thesis, spam refers to any “unsolicited messages,” which means that any message that recipients
do not wish to receive is spam, no matter whether it is a bulk message or not.
1.2 Cost of Spam
Spam has brought and continues to bring significant cost to legitimate email users as well as ESPs.
It is estimated that spam accounts for 85% email traffic today and this percentage will be up to
90% at the end of 2007 if the current increase trend continues [18]. Spam has cost business 50
billion dollars around the world in 2005 [31]. Not only does spam demand significant time and
attention from legitimate individual users, but it also affects ESPs.
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First of all, spam floods mailbox of legitimate users, which makes it hard for them to go through
their email. It takes additional time and attention for legitimate users to find their wanted email,
which reduces productivity. Even worse, legitimate email may be deleted accidentally. Second, one
type of spam, called phishing email, intends to cheat email users. Phishing email [10] attempts to
deceive recipients into disclosing their confidential information, such as private bank information,
credit card number, and social insurance number. Afterwards, spammers can abuse this informa-
tion to commit crime. Consequently, fraudulent email causes users to lose their trust in Internet
transactions, which hurts e-businesses. Experts estimate that 50% of phishing email deceives In-
ternet users by spoofing eBay and Paypal [49]. Figure 1.1(a) shows an example1 of phishing email
which imitates eBay. Figure 1.1(b) presents the fraudulent website, directed by the link in the
phishing email, luring eBay users to disclose their password. Finally, spammers, along with hackers
and virus writers, usually disperse spam by intruding computers which are not theirs2. Currently,
more than 80% of spam worldwide is sent by remote-controlled zombie PCs [56].
Spam brings significant cost to ESPs as well. An ESP may lose its reputation because spammers
find it is easier and cheaper to use its email services to send spam [21]. Secondly, ESPs are forced
to invest greater resources, such as network bandwidth, anti-spam technologies, storage servers,
and customer support, etc. in an effort to fight spam. For example, ESPs have to invest more
effort on inhibiting incoming spam and dealing with customers’ complaints. Last, but not the least,
ESPs may suffer from being added to black lists [53] if spammers initiate a large numbers of spam
through their email servers.
1.3 Spammer Incentives
In this section, we examine why spammers spam. [39] suggests that incentives have been the “cor-
nerstone of human existence”. For example, the fact that parking is more expensive in downtown of
a city is not because the government of the city is cash-strapped, but because the city government
intends to optimize usage of parking lots. The intent of spammers is not just to disturb email users
but to make profit.
However, current email infrastructure allows sending email for free, which allows malicious
spammers to advertise their products through email for free. The only cost that spammers have
to pay is the use of a computer and a subscription to access the Internet. However, compared to a
large volume of spam they send, the marginal cost can be negligible. It is estimated that spammers
can make profit even if only one recipient out of every 100,000 purchases their advertised products
[25].
1The example is from the official website of Anti-Phishing Working Group [24]
2Those compromised computers are called zombie PCs.
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(a) A phishing email
(b) The fraudulent website directed by the link in the phishing email lures legitimate
users to disclose their personal information
Figure 1.1: A phishing email and the forgery website
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1.4 Research Objectives
Current email infrastructure uses SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) [32] to transfer email
among users. At the time when SMTP was designed, Internet users trusted each other. Because
SMTP assumes that Internet users are reliable, it has inherent shortcomings since it was born.
First of all, SMTP does not impose constraints on senders. Not only can senders transmit as many
messages as they want, but they can also send them for free. Moreover, senders do not need to stay
online after they click the send button. Even worse, senders can modify the Return-Path, a header
in the SMTP, which gives spammers an opportunity to cheat recipients. SMTP does not provide
facilities to authenticate senders. On the one hand, current email infrastructure provides significant
power to senders; on the other hand, it does not equip recipients with capabilities to control their
mailbox access except that recipients can delete messages in their mailboxes. Recipients can only
passively accept incoming email. Subsequently, senders can abuse recipients arbitrarily if they want.
The primary goal of this research is to present an approach to solve the challenging spam problem.
In our approach, we think of a mailbox as a type of precious resource. The owner of a mailbox can
manage its mailbox consumption. We construct an ownership-based approach for controlling and
sharing mailbox resources along with other message-related resources.
Our approach has the following characteristics:
Granting more mailbox access control capabilities to recipients: As we mentioned before, current
email infrastructure is essentially sender-driven. Recipients cannot control their incoming messages.
Approaches such as spam filters [54, 26, 27, 53] usually work at the recipient side by allowing
recipients to block incoming spam. Our approach is to enable recipients to react to spam positively.
This means that whether or not a message is transmitted to a recipient is determined by the
recipient.
Controlling messages on both the sender-side and the recipient-side: Until now, most anti-spam
research has focused on defending spam at the recipient side. For instance, spam filters [22, 23, 54]
are usually installed at the recipient side. Signature-based approaches [62, 61, 44, 7] authenticate
senders through allowing recipients to check additional headers inserted by senders. DiffMail [11]
and TCP damping [40] work at the recipient side as well. In DiffMail, recipients differentiate
senders into three categories. Recipients use different strategies to manage incoming messages from
different groups. TCP damping allows recipients to slow down network traffic at the TCP level.
In our approach, we aim to make sender accountable for message transmission. The underlying
principle is that it is a sender’s responsibility to deliver relevant messages because a sender knows
exactly the content of its messages in advance, but recipients do not.
Presenting a flexible mechanism for spam control: One approach to control spam is to discourage
spammers from spamming by making sending spam expensive. Market-based solutions, assigning
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costs in terms of micropayment, human interaction, or computational cost [1, 13, 15, 34, 55], are
based on this idea. These approaches require senders to invest some effort in sending messages.
However, these solutions are not flexible. For example, Zmail [34] requires senders to pay a small
amount of money called e-pennies when they deliver a message; however, besides setting fixed price
for their incoming messages in terms of e-pennies, recipients cannot manage more. We want to
equip recipients with more flexibility in controlling incoming messages.
Constructing a long-term relationship between senders and recipients: At present, no approach
attempts to build a long-term relationship between senders and recipients. All proposed approaches
only accommodate temporary relationships between senders and recipients. For each individual
incoming message, they build a new relationship on the fly. After communication has completed, the
relationship disappears. In our approach, we enable participants to build a long-term relationship
in order to avoid creating a relationship for each individual message.
In this thesis, we present an ownership-based approach for spam control. We think of a mailbox
as a type of precious resource, which others cannot consume freely. Anyone interested in consuming
a mailbox resource must get consent from its owner. Senders can get consent by negotiating with
the potential recipients. The product of a negotiation process is a contract, which is a written
consent regulating the privileges and responsibilities of both the sender and the recipient. The
generated contract controls the successive communication between the sender and the recipient.
By employing contracts, we can combat spam not only on the recipient side but also on the sender
side. Meanwhile, contracts also construct a long-term relationship between senders and recipients.
1.5 Contribution
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• An ownership-based approach for controlling access to mailbox resources
• Prototype implementation
• Separation of policy from mechanism
• Introduction of group ownership rights
• Case studies with example scenarios
• Analysis and experiments to assess feasibility
1.6 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
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Related work is discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes our approach - an ownership-based
approach to message admission control. Prototype design and implementation are elaborated in
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents analytical models and experimental results. Finally, conclusion and
future work are discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
Spam research has received significant attention from the research community recently. For ex-
ample, anti-spam work groups have been founded, such as the Anti-Spam Research Group (ASRG)
of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [24]. Many
ongoing anti-spam projects are carried out by industrial research labs. In addition to technologi-
cal approaches, nations and communities of nations such as the United States, Canada, European
Union, and Australia have enacted laws and legislation to deter spam [45]. In this thesis, we focus
on technological approaches rather than legislative approaches.
There are a variety of anti-spam techniques. We classify them into five groups: filter-based
approaches, signature-based approaches, market-based approaches, protocol-level approaches, and
other approaches. Each class of approaches has its own advantages and disadvantages. Under
specific circumstances, two or more approaches may work more effectively when they work together.
2.1 Filters
We group filters into two categories: non-statistical filters and statistical filters. Generally, non-
statistical filters determine whether a message is spam based on their contact lists. On the other
hand, statistical filters evaluate a message according to their knowledge, which is acquired through
training.
2.1.1 Non-statistical Filters
In this section, we introduce four types of non-statistical filters, which are whitelists, blacklists,
spamtraps, and greylisting. Generally, through maintaining a contact list, the first three approaches
check the list to determine whether an incoming message from a particular sender should be deliv-
ered to the intended recipients. Greylisting works based on the common observation that spammers
do not attempt to send messages twice to the same recipient if the first sending attempt fails.
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Whitelists
A common type of non-statistical filter uses whitelists, (also known as safelists) which contain lists
of contacts. Recipients regard messages from these contacts as desirable. Contacts in a whitelist
can be individual email addresses, IP addresses, or domains. Whitelists can be used in two different
modes: exclusive and non-exclusive. In the exclusive mode, only messages from those in the whitelist
can be delivered to the inbox folder. Messages from others are blocked or deposited into the spam
folder. In the non-exclusive case, messages from contacts in the whitelist are delivered to recipients
directly without being checked by statistical spam filters. This may lead to false positives meaning
that filters misclassify legitimate email as spam. Statistical filters have this inherent problem. We
will discuss it shortly.
The main disadvantage of whitelists is that the cost of list maintenance can be very high. If the
maintenance tasks are carried out by individual users, not all users are willing to update the list
frequently because it takes time to do so. If the ESPs are responsible for updating whitelists, it is
no doubt that maintenance time will increase. However, if a whitelist is not updated in a timely
manner, it will not work effectively. Finally, the whitelists can be explored by spammers [19].
Blacklists
The opposite of whitelists is blacklists [53]. In contrast to whitelists, messages from contacts in a
blacklist are blocked or deleted or sent to the spam folder. Like whitelists, contacts in a blacklist
can be individual email addresses, IP addresses and entire domains. In practice, blacklists are
not used independently. They are combined with statistical filters to avoid false negatives, which
happen when spam is misclassified as legitimate email. Blacklists can help reduce percentage of
false negatives in statistical filters.
The major problem of blacklists is that it is challenging to update the list instantaneously to
reflect the latest information. Spammers always change their IP addresses and domains to send
spam effectively and to avoid being tracked. Therefore, a large number of email addresses, IP
addresses, and domain names can be sources of spam. The effort to maintain such a large volume
of information is demanding. Moreover, a large amount of information demands very large storage
space. Finally, innocent IP addresses and domains may be added into blacklists unexpectedly
when spammers use compromised zombie computers to send messages, which may lead blacklists
to become ineffective.
Spamtraps
A spamtrap is a honeypot [27, 51] used to collect spam. Usually, spamtraps are fake email addresses
which are used exclusively for capturing spam rather than for general communication purpose.
Spamtraps are stored in a location where legitimate email users cannot find them but email address
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harvesters can. Normally, email address harvesters are programs which run automatically to search
for email addresses in the Internet. Spamtraps are typically used to build blacklists: the collected
email addresses are black listed.
The controversial aspect of spamtraps is that they are vulnerable to the backscatter email attack,
which may cause legitimate email to be considered as spam. For example, a malicious spammer can
send email claiming to be from a spamtrap to legitimate users, who will be considered as spammers
by the spamtrap if they or their mail systems respond to the false email.
Greylisting
Based on the observation that spammers do not attempt to send messages again once the first
attempt fails, but legitimate users do, greylisting was invented. MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents)
which employ the greylisting technique temporarily reject any messages from unknown senders and
then accept it at the second. Because legitimate senders try to send messages again and spammers
usually do not retry, legitimate messages get through but spam does not. The information checked
by greylisting-compatible mail servers is a triplet which consists of the IP address of the connecting
host, the envelope sender address, and the envelope recipient address [26].
The main disadvantage of greylisting is that legitimate messages can be lost [38]. Greylisting
assumes that the legitimate email servers will make the second attempt if the first fails; however, in
practice, some email servers may not retry, causing some legitimate messages to be lost. Another
assumption that greylisting is based on is that spammers’ email servers will not make a second
connection attempt. Thus, it is vulnerable to be attacked by spammers if they intend to do so.
One minor disadvantage of greylisting is that it introduces unnecessary delay for legitimate email
users.
2.1.2 Statistical Filters
Statistical spam filters [23, 22, 54] are content-based filters using machine-learning techniques,
which have to be trained to work effectively. Because training and learning processes take time,
the accuracy of recognizing spam increases over time. Commonly, a statistical filter maintains a
collection of words (also known as “Bag-of-words”) which are most likely to be used in spam. An
incoming email containing words in the collection is treated as spam.
One of earliest statistical filters was proposed by Sahami et. al. in 1998. After Paul Graham
published his classic article, “A plan for SPAM,” [22] statistical filters became popular1. Researchers
from Microsoft research employed more comprehensive machine learning systems to attack the spam
problem [19, 20]. To make a machine learning system work effectively, first of all, a large volume of
1Most of them are Bayesian-based filters
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training data, in which messages are identified as spam or regular email, is collected. The second
step is to analyze characteristics of each message and to use these characteristics to train the system.
The analysis not only examines what spam looks like but also determines the features of regular
mail. The characteristics might include words in the message as well as the time when the messages
are sent.
Unfortunately, statistical spam filters have some problems. First of all, they suffer from false
positives and false negatives. False positives may not be acceptable by certain users, because the
misclassified legitimate email may contain critical information. False negatives still bring annoyance
to normal email users. To avoid these two problems, statistical filters often work with a whitelist
and a blacklist. Second of all, spammers can use techniques to adapt new statistical filters rapidly,
which leads to a filter that works one day but will likely not work the next. One example can
be found in [20], which describes an ongoing escalation of technology taking place in the battle
between spammers and anti-spam researchers and developers. For example, the deluge of image
spam has recently increased significantly. However, current statistical filters do not address image
spam because of the high cost of processing images to determine whether the email is spam. Image
spam brings a new challenge to anti-spam researchers and developers. Figure 2.1 shows an example
of image spam.
Figure 2.1: An example of image spam
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2.2 Signature-based approaches
Email spoofing is one of the fraudulent email activities in which the envelope sender address (also
known as Return Path) is forged to appear as though the email has a different source address. Email
from spammers claiming to be from one legitimate contact may easily coax recipients to disclose
their private information such as password, banking information, and credit card number. Email
spoofing has become one of the biggest challenges in common internet activities and reduces email
to a less reliable and trustable communication medium.
Authentication mechanism can be built to avoid email spoofing. However, SMTP does not
provide any facilities to authenticate senders. Signature-based approaches attempt to deal with
this problem. The basic idea behind signature-based approaches is that before transmitting a
message, the sender signs the message in some way. At the other side, the recipient can effectively
authenticate the message. For example, the recipient can authenticate the identity of the sender
through querying the sending DNS server.
There are various signature-based proposals. In this section, we discuss Yahoo DomainKeys [62],
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [61, 50], Message Enhancements for Transmission Authorization
(META) Signatures [37], and Certified Server Validation (CSV) [3].
2.2.1 DomainKeys
DomainKeys developed by Yahoo is an email authentication system for prohibiting email spoofing.
On the sender server side, the domain owner creates a pair of keys: one is a public key and another
is a private key. The private key is stored in the email server and is used to sign outgoing messages.
The public key is published in the DNS server and is used by recipients to verify their incoming
messages.
When a sender uses a DomainKeys-compatible outbound email server to send a message, the
pre-stored private key will be used to generate a digital signature for that message. The digital
signature will be attached to that message as a header entry. At the recipient server side, the
email server extracts the digital signature and the claimed From: Domain header from the received
email and retrieves the public key from the DNS server for the From: Domain. The recipient-side
email server uses the public key to verify the digital signature. If the signature is approved, the
recipient-side email server will deliver the email to the recipient. Otherwise, the email will be
flagged, blocked, or deleted
Cisco’s Identified Internet Mail (IIM) [7] works in the same way as Yahoo DomainKeys. And
lately these two solutions have joined into Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM).
DomainKeys (or DKIM) has difficulties when email forwarders are involved in communication.
Since email forwarders may considerably modify the message, the attached signature may become
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invalid on the recipient-side. Hence, the recipient email server cannot effectively verify the signature.
Another shortcoming of DomainKeys is that generating and verifying digital signatures lead to
needless communication and computation overhead.
2.2.2 Sender Policy Framework
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) extends SMTP by allowing domain owners to publish SPF records
on the domain’s DNS server. The SPF records regulate whether a machine in that domain is
warranted to send email or not. Once the recipient receives a message claiming from that domain,
the recipient can query the DNS server of the claimed domain to check whether the message is
actually coming from the claimed domain or not and whether the sending machine is permitted to
deliver messages by that domain.
Having the same drawback of DomainKeys, SPF does not work well if mail forwarding is in-
volved. In this case, even if the machine that the sender use is permitted to send email; however,
if email is eventually transmitted by an email forwarder in that domain, email may fail to be de-
livered. Moreover, SPF is not applied to the case in which email users tend to change their ISP or
computers quite often in that domain owners have to re-publish SPF records for them.
Sender ID[44] proposed by Microsoft is heavily based on SPF and employs the same mechanism
to prevent email address forgery.
2.2.3 Message Enhancements for Transmission Authorization Signatures
Email may pass through multiple mail servers from senders to recipients. Message Enhancements
for Transmission Authorization (META) Signatures require each mail server en route to add a
cryptographic signature to the email message. Consequently, the subsequent mail server can au-
thenticate the message by querying the previous mail server. This establishes a chain of trust until
the message arrives at the destination.
Although META signatures solve the forwarding problem in DomainKeys and SPF, the require-
ment that all involved mail servers should be META-compatible makes it impossible for incremental
deployment. If one mail server is not enforce META signatures specification, the trust chain would
break and the META authentication would fail. This causes META to be a close system.
2.2.4 Certified Server Validation
Certified Server Validation (CSV) validates a SMTP session by querying the sending domain and
a reputation service. The validation process consists of three steps. Firstly, the recipient’s mail
server examines whether the IP address of the sender’s mail server matches the domain name’s
IP address. Secondly, the recipient’s mail server determines whether the sender’s mail server is
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allowed to transmit email from that domain. Finally, the recipient’s mail server queries a reputation
service such as Spamhaus.org [52], which computes reputation scores for domains, to evaluate the
reputation of the sender’s domain. Whether the message is delivered to the recipient is based on
the results of the above steps.
2.2.5 Signature-based Approach Summary
In summary, signature-based approaches only resolve one aspect of spam problems - the email
spoofing problem, in which spammers deceive victims to trust them and disclose important personal
information to the spammers. However, If spammers do not attempt to hide their identity, these
approaches become ineffective.
2.3 Market-based approaches
Since it is so cheap to spread a deluge of spam, spammers can abuse recipients arbitrarily and
thus debate benefits of recipients. To reverse this situation, various market-based approaches
were proposed in order to make the marginal cost of communication more expensive. Pricing
communication is not a novel idea. As early as 1995, MacKie-Mason and Varian argued that
pricing can make the usage of the scarce Internet resource more efficient and improve public benefits
[43]. Current situation is that while an amount of information increases significantly, the attention
supplying is almost fixed. The market mechanism can make demand and supply more balanced.
The basic idea behind market-based solutions is that senders must demonstrate that they have
committed some efforts to sending email. Commitment can be micropayment, computational cost,
Human Interactive Proofs (HIPs) [55], or Attention Bond Mechanism (ABM) [42] (also called sender
at risk). For legitimate users, the cost that has to pay is very limited, but for spammers whose
economy pattern is based on their abilities to disperse a deluge of spam, the cost may become
extremely high.
2.3.1 Micropayment
One of earliest micropayment approaches, E-stamps [57], was proposed by Brad Templeton in
1995. E-stamps are issued by a digital money bank, and each e-stamp has an expiration date. If
a sender intends to deliver a message, an e-stamp is attached to the message before sending. The
recipient only accepts messages with e-stamps and rejects messages without one. After accepting a
message, the recipient can choose to redeem the attached e-stamp from the bank if the message is
an unsolicited junk email, or to let it expire if the message is from a legitimate user. In the e-stamp
utopia, normal email users do not redeem e-stamps from the bank except when they receive spam.
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The immoral spammers cannot afford the massive burden of email users consistently redeeming
their e-stamps, they might stop sending spam.
From an economic perspective, Kraut et al. [33] proposed that a variable pricing scheme,
combined with targeting information2, rather than a flat pricing rate will improve the benefits to
both senders and recipients.
The main obstacle to deploying a micropayment scheme is that it is impossible to construct
a micropayment infrastructure because the very small amounts of money make transactions non-
profitable. Another barrier is that this scheme is too impolite to be practical. For example, an
email from an unknown person may aim to assist the recipient with a query, which the intended
recipient has posted in a forum. If the recipient asks for e-stamps, the stranger may decline to offer
the assistance.
2.3.2 Computational Challenge
There is an alternative to real-world money called proof-of-work [13], which was first proposed by
Dwork and Naor in 1992. The basic idea is that by computing a complex function, senders present
evidence that they have put computational effort for sending the email. It is not a heavy burden
for normal email users because the computational cost is so small that it can be ignored. However,
the processing time is a limited resource so that spammers cannot afford the computational cost
for massive volume of email, thus prohibiting spammers from distributing spam.
One of the most popular proof-of-work systems is Hashcash [4]. Hashcash requires senders to
calculate a cryptographic function, which is expensive for senders to compute but is relatively cheap
for recipients to verify. To prevent from double-spending hashcash and pre-computed hashcash,
the hashcash function involves two important elements: the destination email address and the
timestamp.
Analysis by Laurie et al. [35] concludes that proof-of-work does not work from the economic
and security perspectives, respectively. However, Liu et al. [41] argue that proof-of-work does work
if combined with reputation mechanisms.
2.3.3 Human Interactive Proofs
Human Interaction Proofs (HIPs) (also known as “Completely Automatic Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart”(CAPTCHAs) [59], or Reverse Turing Test) attempt to prevent the
situation where email is sent automatically by machines. PC World estimates that around 50-80
percent of spam is sent from zombie PCs, which are unprotected personal computers compromised
by spammers and used to send spam. Currently, the volume of spam dispersed by zombie PCs is
2Senders know information about recipients in advance
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still increasing because of out-of-control botnets3. To ensure email is originated by human beings
instead of machines, HIPs are used to tell human beings and computers apart.
Figure 2.2: Gimpy from the CAPTCHA project
A common type of HIPs is a distorted image of a sequence of letters and digits. Figure 2.2
shows a CAPTCHA example4 from the CAPTCHA project official website. As we see, the obscured
characters are easy for humans to recognize, but it is hard or impossible for computers to recognize
them automatically. Another type of CAPTCHA is called pix, which presents a series of images
and asks human beings to determine the difference or similarity among them. An example of pix is
given in Figure 2.3. However, character-based or image-based HIPs may bring barriers to visually
impaired users to use email services normally. To solve this problem, audio-based HIPs are proposed
[58]. The audio HIP puzzles are designed to be easy for human beings to solve, but too hard to
be decoded by computers. A typical audio HIP puzzle is a spoken list of letters or numbers with
intended noise, reverberation, etc.
The shortcoming of HIP is that it is vulnerable to a relay attack in which spammers may employ
cheap human solvers to solve HIPs [9]. A recent study [6] reveals that computers may even beat
human beings at single character recognitions in HIPs.
2.3.4 Attention Bond Mechanisms
Attention Bond Mechanisms [42] (ABM, also called Sender at risk) requires the sender to place
a bond5 on a third party. The recipient can claim the posted bond or request the third party
3botnets are software applications which run automatically over the Internet
4Gimpy is one type of CAPTCHA in the CAPTCHA project.
5Notice that a bond is not a warranty.
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Figure 2.3: Pix from the CAPTCHA project
to release it. The purpose of ABM is to make communication valuable and improve the mutual
benefits of both senders and recipients.
ABM works as follows. If the sender intends to send a message, the sender must post a bond
on a third party. After receiving the message, the recipient examines whether the received message
is desirable. If yes, the recipient will ask the third party to manumit the bond; otherwise, the
recipient will claim the posted bond as compensation for its attention or time.
Like the micropayment solution, ABM may be considered impolite if legitimate users intend
to send email to recipients, who use ABM-enhanced mail server. For example, for companies who
leave their email addresses on their websites, ABM may deter potential customers to contact the
companies, thus causing them to lose businesses.
2.4 Protocol-level approaches
In this section, we introduce three protocol level approaches. DiffMail attempts to modify current
SMTP protocol. Internet Mail 2000 (IM2000) tries to replace SMTP protocol completely. Tarpit
works at SMTP level or even lower at TCP level.
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2.4.1 DiffMail
DiffMail [11] uses Differentiate Mail Transport Protocol (DMTP) [12] to transport messages. DMTP
provides facilities to enable recipients to control their incoming messages. DiffMail categorizes
senders into three classes: well-known spammers, regular contacts, and unclassified sources. Re-
cipients handle each group differently. Messages from the regular contact class are processed in
the same way as in the current email architecture. Messages from the well-known spammers are
rejected. When a message is from unclassified sources, contrast to current email systems which
deliver messages to the recipient-side servers, a DMTP-compatible mail server keeps the complete
message on itself, and tries to send the original message which is encapsulated by an envelope (a
type of short message) to the recipient-side mail server. The recipient-side server checks if the
sender comes from unclassified sources. If yes, the recipient-side server only accepts the envelope
message and delivers it to the recipient. At this point, the complete original message is kept in the
sender-side mail server. If the recipient decides to accept the original message, it can retrieve the
message from the sender-side mail server at its convenient time using facilities provided by DMTP.
DMTP attempts to grant extra capabilities to recipients and modify current SMTP. However,
it still depends on whitelists and blacklists or similar services to work productively.
2.4.2 Internet Mail 2000
Internet Mail 2000 (IM2000) [5] is a project which intends to design a new email infrastructure
and replaces the current protocol - SMTP completely. The core concept is that mail storage is the
sender’s responsibility rather than recipients’. A complete message from the sender is stored on the
sender’s ESP and occupies the sender’s disk quota. The recipient is informed by a brief notification
from the sender’s ESP. The sender’s ESP must always stay online in order that the recipient can
retrieve the message at her convenient time. It is determined by the recipient if the message should
be retrieved, which prohibits spammers from vanishing after sending spam. After downloading the
message, the recipient can deliver an acknowledgement message to the sender’s ESP in order to
notify it to delete the downloaded message. Otherwise, the sender’s ESP will retransmit the brief
notification periodically.
Unfortunately, it is not reasonable to completely replace current SMTP protocol in one night.
Hence, to deploy IM2000 becomes an incredible mission.
2.4.3 Tarpits
Tarpits assume that spammers are impatient email users. The typical method used by a tarpit is
that the recipient-side mail server deliberately slows down the response to connection requests from
the sender-side mail server [40]. To reach this goal, the recipient-side mail server can reduce the
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advertisement windows, fake congestion, or intentionally wait for a while and then respond to the
request. Commonly, spammers will give up the sending attempt if they find it is hard to construct
a connection with the recipient-side mail server. This kind of tarpit works at the TCP level.
Another type of tarpit is SMTP tarpit [14, 17], which intentionally postphones sending SMTP
greeting banner to the client. In SMTP, the client has to wait for receiving the greeting banner
before it sends any data to the server. However, spammers are too impatient to wait for the greeting
banner. Thus, the server can promptly identify the connecting request coming from spammers and
decline the request.
Like greylisting, in practice, some email servers cannot process tarpits correctly causing legiti-
mate email to be lost.
2.5 Other approaches
In this section, we present three anti-spam approaches: disposable email addresses, Spamalot, and
an approach of blocking outgoing spam.
2.5.1 Disposable Email Addresses
Gabber et al. [16] proposed solving spam problems using extended email addresses, which are
generated by appending extensions to original (or core) email addresses. Extended email addresses
are disposable. Each user has multiple extended email addresses but only one core email address,
which is not used for communication purpose but only for generating extended email addresses.
For example, alice@example.com is a core email address, which is not used for communication.
alice+a1b2c3@example.com is an extended email address, which is created through adding a1b2c3
to the core email address. Any one who wants to send email to the intended recipient, they
must have an extended email address of the recipient. The sender requests one extended email
address through a mechanism called handshake. Once the sender obtains an extended email address,
the sender can use it to transmit email to the recipient. However, if a user realizes that one
of her extended email addresses is compromised, she can discard the victim address right away.
Therefore, the contact using the discarded email address cannot transmit email to her. However,
normal communication with other regular contacts will not be affected. The contact which uses
the compromised one must acquire a new one through another handshake process. Currently, ESPs
such as Spamgourmet and Gmail have used disposable email addresses to solve spam problems.
The main drawback of disposable email addresses is that it is hard for some users to remember
the extensions. Another shortcoming is that it is not easy for system administrator to manage
email accounts.
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2.5.2 Spamalot
In [8], Cranor et al. advocate for combatting spam by counterattacking them. In 2006, researchers
from University of Illinois at Chicago built an anti-spam toolkit named Spamalot system [47] to
exhaust spammers’ resources to cause fruitless communication for spammers. Spamalot system
uses intelligent agents, currently including three agents: Arthur, Patsy, and Lancelot, to answer
back spammers to achieve the goal of consuming spammers’ resources. By aggressively responding
spammers, the authors argue that spam can be greatly reduced.
However, this approach assumes that it is human being not machines to process the feedback.
If spammers have software which can interact with the Spamalot automatically, the spamalot will
fail.
2.5.3 Sender-side Approaches
Almost all previous works focus on curbing spam at the recipient side. Nevertheless, spammers have
many incentives to disperse spam through ESPs [21]. Increasing costs stimulate ESPs to thwart
outgoing spam. One approach [63] proposed by Zhong et al. describes that by installing a spam
filter at the ESP server, each outgoing message is scored a spam-likelihood value. According to
the assigned score, the ESP server select a corresponding computational task for the sender. The
message is not sent until the computational result has been presented by the sender. In another
approach [21], the ESP servers can use HIPs, computational challenges, and micropayment to deter
spammers to spread spam through them. This approach has the same problems as the recipient-side
approaches when they use the same techniques.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter reviews related anti-spam works including filter-based approaches, signature-based ap-
proaches, market-based approaches, protocol-level approaches, and three other approaches. Filter-
based approaches separate and block spam. Signature-based approaches provide email authentica-
tion mechanism for current email infrastructure. The idea behind market-based approaches is to
make the marginal cost of sending email more expensive; thus, spammers are not willing to dis-
tribute spam aimlessly. Protocol-level approaches attempt to modify or completely replace SMTP.
A disposable email address can be discarded if the owner find it was compromised. Spamalot ar-
gues that email users should aggressively respond to spammers to exhaust their resources. Stopping
outgoing spam by ESPs can undoubtedly reduce a large volume of outgoing spam.
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Chapter 3
Ownership-based Message Admission Control
We create an approach by specializing CyberOrgs [29], which is a model for resource bounded
distributed systems. Each cyberorg in the CyberOrgs model owns a certain amount of resources
and can control how resources are to be consumed. In this thesis, we control a mailbox as a resource
of its owner. Thus, the CyberOrgs model is desirable to be used to build our approach.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: In Section 3.1, we present the CyberOrgs model
briefly. Section 3.2 describes our approach - ownership-based message admission control mechanism
for curbing spam. We address negotiation ingredients and products in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 elab-
orates four communication scenarios. In Section 3.5, we introduce a self-protective mechanism to
prevent an undesirable situation, in which malicious senders may produce too many error messages.
Finally, the last section summarizes our approach from a different perspective.
3.1 CyberOrgs Model
CyberOrgs [29] is a model for resource control in multi-agent systems. In the CyberOrgs model, a
cyberorg is a resource boundary which encapsulates a certain amount of resources and a collection of
concurrent computations. Computations inside one cyberorg can only consume resources bound to
the same cyberorg. Cyberorgs organize computations and resources as a tree hierarchy. Except the
root cyberorg, each cyberorg is accommodated in another cyberorg, which is the parent cyberorg of
the former one. Before being encapsulated, the intending cyberorg must negotiate a contract with a
potential parent cyberorg. The contract stipulates the types and quantities of resources, which will
be available to the encapsulated cyberorg, and their costs. To satisfy its needs, the encapsulated
cyberorg can purchase resources from its parent cyberorg according to the contract between them.
The currency used by cyberorgs is called eCash.
CyberOrgs provides three primitives to facilitate resource control, such as isolate, assimilate,
and migrate.
• isolate
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As shown in Figure 3.1(a), using isolate primitive, one cyberorg can spawn another
cyberorg, which is encapsulated by the original cyberorg. The new cyberorg consists of actors,
eCash, messages, and certain amount of resources, which are from the creating cyberorg.
Moreover, a new contract is generated to regulate the trade of resources between them.
• assimilate
Figure 3.1(b) illustrates the assimilate primitive. Obviously, an assimilation process is
the opposite of an isolation process. As shown in the figure, the exterior cyberorg dissolves
the inner cyberorg; at the same time, the outside one acquires actors, eCash, messages, and
resources which were possessed by the inside one. We should notice that the contract between
two cyberorgs does not exists any more.
Figure 3.1: Cyberorg Primitives: isolation and assimilation
• migrate
Depicted by Figure 3.2, one cyberorg can migrate into another cyberorg. This happens
when a cyberorg comprehends that its resource requirement cannot be satisfied by current
contract with its parent cyberorg. Thus, it intends to negotiate a new contract with others
to satisfy its needs. To reach its goal, the intended cyberorg must carry out a series of tasks.
First of all, the cyberorg has to find one potential cyberorg which can provide sufficient
resources. Second of all, the intended one must achieve a contract with the potential one
through a negotiation process. Finally, once a desired contract is generated, the intended
cyberorg migrates to the destination cyberorg, which provides a certain amount of resources
to the new encapsulated cyberorg and gets paid according to the contract.
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Figure 3.2: Cyberorg primitives: migration
In the CyberOrgs model, resources can be controlled using the above primitives. Resources flow
from the root cyberorg to the leaves in the cyberorg hierarchy, and the eCash flows in the opposite
direction. A cyberorg can acquire resources from any cyberorg as long as there is a contract between
them.
3.2 Our Approach
The ownership-based message admission control mechanism is constructed on the CyberOrgs model.
In our approach, we consider a mailbox to be a precious resource of its owner. Not only does a
mailbox abstract physical entities, such as hard drive storage, CPU cycles, and network bandwidth,
but it also represents time and attention of its owner. Mailbox owners have capabilities to control
their mailbox access. Anyone who wants to send messages to a mailbox has to get permission
from its owner. On the one hand, a sender can consume a mailbox by delivering messages to the
recipient. On the other hand, to prevent from being accessed freely, the recipient manages its
mailbox by controlling an access admission. To send a message, a sender has to get access right
from the recipient. After holding a permission, it can send messages to the recipient.
3.2.1 Overview
In this section, we describe our approach briefly. The reminder of Section 3.2 illustrates our
approach in detail.
In our approach, we have two types of communicating entities called cells and groups. Communi-
cation among communicating entities is through sending and receiving messages. A communicating
entity can join a group; the later is called the parent group of the former, and the former is called
the group member of its parent group. A cell can have multiple parent groups; however, a group
can only belong to one group. Group members can consume resources of their parent group.
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A sender must have “write” permission of a recipient’s mailbox before it sends messages to the
recipient. A sender who attempts to get “write” permission initiates a negotiation process with
the recipient. For the sender, the desired outcome of the negotiation process is a contract, which
represents the “write” permission and stipulates the subsequent communication between the sender
and the recipient. Whether a contract is reached is based on both the sender’s and the recipient’s
policies. A typical negotiation process should carry out the following three steps:
• According to its policy, the sender makes a proposal, which may include payment or favor
which the sender would like to do for the recipient.
• The recipient evaluates the proposal based on its policy.
• If the proposal is accepted, a contract will be generated. The sender can send messages
to the recipient according to the contract. Otherwise, the recipient declines the proposal
by responding a refusal message, which is an unanticipated product of the negotiation. If
the sender still intends to send messages, it should make a better proposal and start a new
negotiation process.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: Section 3.2.2 introduces communicating entities.
The primitives are discussed in Section 3.2.3. Section 3.2.4 discusses currency used in our approach.
The detailed negotiation process is described in Section 3.3.
3.2.2 Communicating Entities
In this section, we introduce communicating entities. There are two kinds of communicating entities,
which are cells and groups. We use cyberorgs to represent communicating entities. Thus, each
communicating entity has its own resources and computations. The communicating entities, which
are sources and targets of messages, can interact with each other through sending and receiving
messages.
As we mentioned before, a cell can join multiple groups. It is incredible to imagine that a cell
is splitted into several parts and each part is a member of a group. Hence, in our approach, when
a cell joins a group, rather than the cell itself enters into the group, it creates a proxy, which enters
into the group and represents the creating cell. The proxy is called a satellite. In this section, we
describe cells, groups, and satellites.
Cells
One basic communicating entity is a cell which can abstract human users or mail user agents,
which are used to send and receive messages. A cell is a cyberorg which encapsulates one mailbox
and one user interface agent, which provides an interface for sending or receiving messages or for
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management purposes (such as deleting messages and creating new message folders) to human
users. Figure 3.3 depicts a cell. The black dot inside the cell is the user interface agent. Notice
that there is a mailbox in the cell.
Figure 3.3: Communicating entity: a cell
A mailbox is a resource which is controlled by the cell which encapsulates it. The encapsulated
agent has “read”, “write”, and “delete” access right to the associated mailbox. Any incoming
messages to the agent must be stored in the affiliated mailbox. Originators of messages who intend
to deposit messages to a mailbox have to obtain “write” permission from the cell which encapsulates
the mailbox. As long as a sender has a contract with a recipient, outgoing messages to the recipient
will go to the mailbox of that recipient directly.
A cell can play various roles when it is under different circumstances.
• Sender: a cell which initiates a negotiation process for intending to send messages
• Recipient: a cell which examines proposals for receiving messages
• Subscriber: a cell which commences a negotiation process for intending to receive messages.
• Publisher: a cell which evaluates proposals for dispersing messages
Besides from the mailbox resource, a cell may have other resources, such as policies and con-
tracts. Policies are used for the negotiation purpose. Contracts stipulate resource usages between
two sides. We will discuss these two resources shortly.
A cell has a unique name but may have multiple aliases and can use its name or its aliases to
communicate with others. In fact, an alias is the name of one of the cell’s satellite in our approach.
Groups
Another basic communicating entity is a group which corresponds to an organization in human
society. A group is a cyberorg which contains one mailbox, one outgoing message queue (MQ),
one user interface agent and may encapsulate other communicating entities. The user interface
agent is for communication and administration purposes. Each group member has a contract with
its parent group, which determines resource usages, such as access permission to the mailbox and
MQ of the parent group. Basically, in a group, members can read messages from the mailbox and
the MQ and can write messages into the MQ; whereas the user interface agent can read, write,
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and delete messages from the mailbox and the MQ. In a group, different group members may have
different access rights to the mailbox and the MQ according to their own contracts with the parent
group. For example, one member is able to read messages from the mailbox but does not have
privileges to write to the MQ; however, another can deposit messages into the MQ but cannot read
the mailbox. The access rights are regulated by the contract between a group member and the
group.
If a group itself wants to send a message to a recipient, the message will be stored into the
mailbox of the recipient provided that there is an existing contract between them. However, if a
group member wants to send a message to a recipient through its parent group, the message will
be stored in the MQ of its parent group. Whether the message is sent or not is determined by the
parent group.
A typical group is illustrated in Figure 3.4. The triangle is a satellite, which will be discussed
shortly.
Figure 3.4: Communicating entity: a group
In addition to a mailbox and an outgoing message queue, a group may possess policies and
contracts, which are resources that can be used by itself and its group members.
Like a cell, as a communicating entity, a group can be a sender, a recipient, a subscriber, or a
publisher. Unlike a cell, a group cannot join multiple groups. In other words, a group can only
have one parent group (if any).
Satellites
As we suggested before, when a cell attempts to join a group, it creates a proxy, which is a duplicate
of the creating cell. The proxy is called a satellite, which represents the creating cell in the hosting
group. The name of the satellite is an alias of the creating cell. Because satellites are copies of
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their creating cell, satellites are cyberorgs in our approach. Before joining a group, the satellite
must reach a contract with the potential hosting group. Because a cell can join multiple groups, it
has corresponding number of satellites.
A satellite should hold the following properties:
• possesses a unique name
• must exist in a group
• represents the creating cell in the hosting group
• can communicate with the creating cell
However, a satellite cannot create another satellite.
3.2.3 Primitives
As we mentioned before, one cell may determine to join another group. By contrast, a cell can
choose to depart one of its parent groups if any. Similarly, a group may join or depart its parent
group if it has one. We discuss these primitives in this section.
Cells and Groups
A cell can join a group meaning that the cell creates a satellite, which migrates to the destination
group and represents the creating cell in the hosting group. We call the hosting group the parent
group of the creating cell. The creating cell and its satellites can communicate with each other by
sending and receiving messages. The join process can be described as follows (Figure 3.5):
• The intending cell negotiates a contract with a potential parent group.
• The agent in the intending cell duplicates itself .
• The intending cell creates a satellite which encapsulates the created agent.
• The created satellite migrates to the potential group.
Because a satellite is a cyberorg, it holds a contract with its parent group.
When a cell decides to depart one of its parent groups, it sends a message to the corresponding
satellite. Upon receiving the message, the satellite migrates out of its parent group.
Relationship between Groups
Unlike cells, a group can join another group through migrating to it directly, provided that the
former group has reached a contract with the target group. On the other side, when its parent
group cannot guarantee its resource satisfaction, an encapsulated member will depart its parent
group using the migrate primitive of the CyberOrgs model.
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Figure 3.5: Primitive: a cell joins a group
Example
Let us suppose Alice, our exemplary user, has an email client on her machine, which can be used
to send and receive email. Meanwhile, she is an employee of an organization called A and she has
a free email account on an ESP named B. Under this circumstance, Alice can communicate with
others through her email accounts of both A and B. Afterwards, she quits her job in A and get
another job in the organization C. At this point, Alice cannot use her email account in A but can
start interaction with the new email account in the organization C; however, the free email account
is not affected.
3.2.4 Currency
As we mentioned in Section 3, when a sender attempts to deliver a message to a recipient, the
sender must negotiate with the recipient. In the negotiation process, the sender presents a proposal
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to compensate the recipient for consuming its mailbox. One ingredient of the proposal is a certain
amount of money which the sender would like to pay. In our approach, like the CyberOrgs model,
the currency used by cells and groups is called eCash. The minimum unit of eCash is called e-penny,
which is a type of “token money”. In other words, e-penny is a type of proof-of-work [41], which
assures recipients that messages are worth reading in that senders have spent certain amount of
effort on transmitting messages. Efforts may be computational cost, human effort, or real money.
After the recipient accepts the offer, the payment can go to the recipient or a central authority in
a real system.
3.3 Negotiation
In this section, we present the negotiation process in detail. In our daily life, for example, when
an individual wants to buy a car, she has an acceptable maximum price in her mind. She would
purchase a car if the real price is below the acceptable maximum price. This is her buying policy.
For a particular car, car dealers have a desirable minimum price in their mind. They would sell the
car if buyers are likely to accept a price higher than the minimum price. This is car dealers’ sale
policy. Customers and car dealers reach an agreement with a win-win price.
Likewise, in our approach, senders and recipients reach a contract based on their policies. Before
a negotiation, a sender and a recipient must have policies. On the one hand, a sender generates a
proposal according to its own policies. On the other hand, a recipient evaluates a proposal based
on its own policies. We describe policies in Section 3.3.1. Section 3.3.2 elaborates how to generate
a proposal based on a given policy. The products of a negotiation process is discussed in Section
3.3.3.
3.3.1 Policies
For negotiation purposes, there are two types of policies which are sending policies and receiving
policies. Sending policies are used by senders to make proposals. On the other side, receiving
policies are used by recipients to evaluate proposals. Thus, to send messages, a sender must possess
sending policies. Otherwise, it cannot interact with others. If a recipient does not want to evaluate
proposals, it may not have receiving policies, which means that the recipient is likely to permit
all incoming messages to go through. Each communicating entity maintains a policy pool, which
consists of its sending policies and receiving policies. One selects a policy from its policy pool to
meet its needs when it participates in a negotiating process.
Policies can be arbitrarily complex. For example, a simple policy can be: one e-penny for one
message, while a more complex policy can look like: ten e-pennies for ten messages within two days,
which means that sending or receiving ten messages must occur within two days and the price of
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ten messages is ten e-pennies.
A sender or a recipient may maintain particular policies for a special counterpart. For example, a
sender may configure a particular policy for Bob: three e-pennies for one message when the recipient
is Bob. Similarly, a recipient may hold a particular policy like: three e-pennies for receiving one
message if the sender is Alice. On the one hand, when delivering a message, if the sender owns
a particular policy for the recipient, the sender will make a proposal based on this particular
policy. On the other hand, the recipient will use a particular policy to assess the proposal from the
particular sender, if it has one.
As we suggested before, a communicating entity can be a member of a group. In this case,
the communicating entity can use policies of its parent group. It can use these policies to make
a proposal as a sender or evaluate a proposal as a recipient. However, because policies are also
resources, whether the group’s policies can be used by a member is determined by the contract
between them. The contract is generated through a negotiation process at the time when that
member intends to join the group.
3.3.2 Proposals
Proposals are built by senders based on their sending policies. After sending policies are settled,
a sender is regulated by its sending policies when making a proposal. Basically, the sender is not
likely to make better proposals compared to its policies. For example, if a sender holds a sending
policy like: I would like to pay two e-pennies for sending one message, it is not reasonable for the
sender to make a better offer such that three e-pennies for sending one message, but a worse offer
such that one e-penny for one message is possible.
Corresponding to particular policies, a sender makes a particular proposal when it has a par-
ticular policy for a special recipient. When the sender wants to make a proposal to a recipient, it
examines whether there is a particular policy for the recipient. If yes, the sender will select the
particular one to make a proposal. Otherwise, the sender will make a proposal based on its general
policies.
3.3.3 Negotiation Products
In a negotiation process, whether or not a recipient accepts a sender’s proposal, it should deliver
a response message to the sender. According to the response, two different types of products are
generated. If the recipient accepts the sender’s proposal based on its receiving policies, the desired
product, a contract, is generated, which stipulates communications between participants. However,
a contract might become invalid after it accomplishes its mission. For instance, one contract has a
requirement that the recipient must accept ten messages from the sender. After the recipient accepts
the tenth messages from the sender, the contract will not work any more. If the sender attempts
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to deliver more, it has to re-negotiate a contract with the target. However, when a communicating
entity is a member of a group, it can employ contracts of its parent group to transmit messages as
long as the group consents to do so. We will discuss this point in Section 3.4.
Obviously, a proposal may be declined by the recipient, we call it an unacceptable proposal.
A declining message acknowledged by the recipient is called a refusal message, which is not desir-
able and not relevant to normal communication. The refusal messages are another product of a
negotiation process.
3.4 Communication Scenarios
In this section, we present four communication scenarios as follows:
1. Neither the sender nor the recipient belongs to a group.
2. The sender does but the recipient does not belong to a group.
3. The sender does not but the recipient does belong to a group.
4. Both the sender and the recipient belong to a group.
When the sender belongs to a group, it can send two types of messages through its parent group:
personal messages and group messages. Personal messages represent the sender itself; however,
group messages represent opinions of its parent group. A group message needs to be evaluated by
the group and other group members to determine whether to be sent or not. Furthermore, when
sending personal messages, group members use contracts of their parent group; To regulate its
members’ behavior, a group sets a message quota for each member. A message quota specifies that
the maximum number of personal messages of a member can be sent through its parent group. If
the number of personal messages of one sender has sent rises above its message quota, it cannot
send more except that it requests more message quota. Message quota can be used by ESPs to stop
outgoing spam [21]. For example, an ESP can set message quota for its email users. Thus, spammers
cannot spread spam through this ESP arbitarily. Hotmail has already this type of limitation for
its users in 2003 [48].
3.4.1 Neither The Sender Nor The Recipient Belongs to A Group
When neither the sender nor the recipient belongs to a group, we further have two basic situations:
if there is an existing contract between the sender and the recipient, and if there is no existing
contract between the sender and the recipient. In the first case, the sender uses the existing
contract to transmit messages. In the second one, the sender has to initiate a negotiation process.
The sender can transmit messages to the recipient once a contract between them is generated. We
call this scenario Scenario I.
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3.4.2 The Sender Belongs to A Group
In this scenario, the sender belongs to a group but the recipient does not. The sender can send
personal messages and group messages through its parent group.
If the sender attempts to transmit an personal message through its parent group, the message
will be delivered if and only if:
• there is an existing contract between the parent group of the sender and the recipient, and
• the sender does not run out of its message quota.
Otherwise, the parent group of the sender has to negotiate a contract with the recipient or the
sender solicits more message quota from its parent group.
In addition to sending personal messages, a sender can send group messages as well. If a sender
wants to send a group message, the group message is stored into the MQ of its parent group.
Because a group message represents the opinion of the group, whether a group message is sent is
determined by the group and other group members. If the group determines to send the group
message, the group becomes a sender and this case turns into the Scenario I, where neither the
sender nor the recipient belongs to a group.
3.4.3 The Recipient Belongs to A Group
When a sender does not belong to a group but a recipient does, the message will be sent if and only
if there is an existing contract between the sender and the recipient. Otherwise, the sender has to
negotiate a contract with the recipient. This case is the same as the Scenario I.
In this scenario, we do not require that there is an existing contract between the sender and
the parent group of the recipient, because if the recipient is a cell, which may have multiple parent
groups, the situation would become too complex to meet the requirement.
3.4.4 Both The Sender And The Recipient Belong to A Group
If both a sender and a recipient belong to a group, we also have two cases. If the sender wants
to send a group message, which represents its parent group or all members in the same group, the
group message will be deposited into the MQ. Whether the group message is sent is determined by
the group. Under this circumstance, the group becomes a sender and this scenario falls into the
scenario described in Section 3.4.3, where the sender does not belong to a group but the recipient
does.
If a sender intends to send an personal message through its parent group, the message will be
sent if and only if:
• there is an existing contract between the parent group of the sender and the recipient, and
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• the sender does not run out of its message quota.
From the above scenario analysis, we should notice that whether the recipient belongs to a
group or not does not affect communication between the sender and the recipient.
3.4.5 Communication Scenario Examples
In this section, we give two examples to illustrate the four communication scenarios. In the first
example, we describe how communicating entities interact. In the second example, we use our
approach to model real world email communication.
Example 1 (Figure 3.6). Consider Alice, represented by a cell, wants to send a message to Bob,
represented by another cell. Alice belongs to two groups: one is student and another is staff. Bob
is a member of faculty group. Alice holds a contract with Bob. At the same time, student and
staff also have a contract with Bob separately. The message quotas of Alice in student and staff
are 50 and 30, respectively. Under this circumstance, Alice can transmit messages to Bob directly.
If she like, she also can send personal messages to Bob through student group and staff group as
long as the number of messages she has sent through these two groups does not exceed 50 and 30,
respectively.
Figure 3.6: Example: communication between two cells
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Example 2 (Figure 3.7) In this example, Alice has an email account in Gmail. Bob has an email
account in YahooMail. If Alice wants to send email to Bob, Alice must have a contract with Bob;
at the same time, Gmail must have a contract with YahooMail. When an email goes from Alice to
Bob, that email use the contract between Alice and Bob. However, when Gmail sends an email to
YahooMail, the communication between them is regulated by the contract between them. Under
this circumstance, Gmail is a sender and YahooMail is a recipient. If there is no existing contract
between Gmail and YahooMail, Alice cannot send email to Bob.
Figure 3.7: Example: communication between two email users
3.5 Penalties
As suggested in Section 3.3, it is possible that the system is flooded by numerous refusal messages
if senders make a large volume of unacceptable proposals. A large number of refusal messages
are undesirable in that they waste resources. This back door may be exploited by spammers to
abuse the system in real world. Under this circumstance, senders should have right for making
a proposal. If a sender does not hold such right, the sender cannot make a proposal. We call
this right meta-contract. We introduce a self-protective mechanism called the penalty mechanism.
A communicating entity is considered as abnormal provided that it makes proposals without a
meta-contract.
Recall that in the CyberOrgs model, there is a root cyberorg, which encapsulates all other
cyberorgs in the system. In our approach, there is a global cyberorg, which contains and manages
all cells and groups in the system. Each communicating entity has penalty policies. Like policies
in Section 3.3.1, penalty policies can be specified for a particular cell or group. Typical penalties
can be blocking penalties and financial penalties. If one abnormal cell or group violates the penalty
policy of another cell or group, the later one will apply penalties to the former one by reporting
to the global cyberorg, which may either block any sending attempt from the abnormal one to the
reporter or appropriate the abnormal one a certain amount of eCash dependent on the penalty
policy of the reporter.
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3.5.1 Penalty Policy Example
In this example, one cell has a penalty policy like: if anyone sends me 50 unacceptable proposals
per day, I will block it for 10 days. With this constraint, the cell or group who sends more than
50 non-acceptable proposals daily is considered as the abnormal one by the policy holder, which
declines any message from the abnormal one for ten days. A financial penalty policy can be like: if
anyone sends me 50 non-acceptable proposals, I will claim ten e-pennies for compensation.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents an ownership-based message admission control mechanism. The approach
is built from the CyberOrgs model. In our approach, every communicating entity is a cyberorg.
A mailbox is considered as a precious resource of its owner. Access to the mailbox is controlled
by its owner. If one intends to send messages to another, the former must negotiate a contract
with the later. A contract represents access permission, which allows a sender to deliver messages
to a recipient. To negotiate a contract, both the sender and the recipient must possess policies.
Whether the contract is generated or not is based on their policies. We introduce groups, which are
in analogous with organizations in human society. Groups can control their resource consumption.
By joining a group, a communicating entity can use resources of its parent group. To avoid too
many refusal messages, our approach has a penalty mechanism, which discourages communicating
entities deliberately deteriorate system performance.
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Chapter 4
Prototype Design and Implementation
In this chapter, we describe a proof-of-concept prototype implementation based on our approach
discussed in the previous chapter. The prototype is developed using the Actor Architecture (AA)
[30], which is an implementation of the Actor model [2] of concurrent computation.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: We briefly introduce the Actor model and Actor
Architecture in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 presents the system architecture. Section 4.3 introduces the
types of messages in our implementation. We distinguish between normal messages, which consti-
tute user communication, from auxiliary messages. The implementation of cyberorgs including cells
and groups is described in Section 4.4. Message handlers, which provide communication services to
communicating entities, are introduced in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 discusses the central authority
responsible for issuing eCash and enabling contract accountability. Section 4.7 and Section 4.8 elab-
orate how cyberorgs select a policy when they have multiple choices and how policies are separated
from mechanisms. The implementation of communication patterns is discussed in Section 4.9. The
last section summarizes this chapter. In this chapter, we use cyberorgs and communicating entities
interchangeably.
4.1 Actor Model and Actor Architecture
The Actor model offers an object oriented foundation for concurrent computation. An actor en-
capsulates state, behavior, a message buffer, and a thread of control (Figure 4.1). Actors can be
viewed an active communicating object. In this thesis, we think of actors as independent processes
which can run concurrently.
Because the internal behavior of an actor is encapsulated, it cannot be observed from outside
directly. Actors interact with the external world only through sending and receiving asynchronous
messages. Each actor has a unique name and a message buffer to receive messages in. Actors
compute by processing messages received in their message buffer. An actor will wait if its message
buffer is empty. An actor can only communicate with actors for which it has names. An actor a
can know another actor b’s name in one of the following ways:
• b’s name is contained in a message received by a
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• b’s name was provided to a at its own creation time
• a created b
To respond to a message, an actor performs a local computation (which may be represented by
any computer program) and three primitive actor operations:
• send messages: an actor may send messages to other actors.
• create actors: an actor may create new actors with particular behaviors.
• become ready to accept a message: an actor becomes ready to process the next message in
its message buffer.
Figure 4.1: An actor
Actor Architecture (AA) is a Java-based implementation of the Actor model. AA is a middle-
ware system architecture, which provides an Actor execution environment and an Actor API to
implement actors. An Actor execution environment on a computer node is called an AA platform.
Each actor executes on an AA platform, which provides communication services to actors.
Because actors naturally model communicating concurrent processes, we use actors to implement
the communicating entities in our system.
4.2 System Architecture
There are three layers in our system architecture. From top to down, they are user interface (UI)
layer, cyberorg layer, and message handler (MH) layer, shown in Figure 4.2. At the sender side,
messages flow from the UI layer to the MH layer, and at the recipient side, messages flow in the
opposite direction.
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The UI layer presents graphic user interfaces or command user interfaces to allow human users
to exchange messages with others and perform management tasks, such as configuring policies and
purchasing e-pennies.
The cyberorg layer hosts cells and groups. As we mentioned in Chapter 3, cells and groups are
communicating entities, which provide communication facilities and management facilities to the UI
layer. In our prototype, cyberorgs cannot communicate with each other directly. By contrast, each
cyberorg must have an associated message handler, which is located in the MH layer. Cyberorgs
interact with the external world through their affiliated message handlers.
The MH layer provides communication services to cyberorgs in the cyberorg layer. Moreover,
message handlers maintain information on behalf of associated cyberorgs. For example, policies of
a cyberorg are stored on its associated message handler so that the message handler can make a
proposal or evaluate a proposal on behalf of the cyberorg automatically. Recall that cyberorgs use
eCash to trade in resources; each cyberorg’s eCash account is also maintained by its corresponding
message handler. We discuss these information in detail in Section 4.5.
Moreover, there is a Central Authority (CA) in the MH layer as well. One responsibility of
the CA is to issue eCash. Another purpose of the CA is to ensure contract accountability. As we
suggested in Chapter 3, one product of a negotiation process is a contract. In our prototype, each
participant holds a copy of the contract. A third copy of the contract is deposited on the CA for
accountability purposes. CA is transparent to cyberorgs. Only message handlers are aware of the
existence of the CA.
Figure 4.2: System architecture: three layers
4.2.1 Overview
As shown in Figure 4.3, in our prototype, equivalent to email accounts, cyberorgs are sources and
targets of messages. Corresponding to real email servers, message handlers play the server role in
our prototype. To simplify our discussion, we refer to cyberorgs as clients of their corresponding
message handlers, which are localmessage handlers of the cyberorgs. The CA, which is a component
absent in existing email systems, issues eCash and supports contract accountability for the system.
A message handler runs on a computer node (or on an AA platform). However, one com-
puter node may host multiple message handlers. Each message handler is a server which provides
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Figure 4.3: Big picture of the prototype
messaging services to its clients.
The next section describes types of messages used in our prototype. The remainder sections
elaborate the implementation of our prototype in detail.
4.3 Messages
In our prototype, messages are categorized into two groups: system messages and user messages.
System messages are invisible to cyberorgs. Message handlers and the CA transfer system messages
among them to carry out fundamental functionalities, such as storing contract, purchasing eCash,
etc. System messages are not delivered to cyberorgs.
User messages can be sent and read by cyberorgs. They are further grouped into four classes,
including normal messages, request messages, response messages, and error messages.
Normal messages Normal messages come from senders and target to recipients. Normal mes-
sages contain general purpose communication information between senders and recipients.
Request Messages A sender issues a request message to a recipient when the former intends to
send a message to the later. Each request message contains a proposal.
Response Messages A recipient sends a response message which corresponds to a request mes-
sage. The response message indicates whether the recipient accepts or rejects the sender’s proposal.
Error Messages Error messages are response messages. When a response message declines the
sender’s proposal, we call it an error message in our implementation. A sender should not raise too
many unacceptable proposals, because they would result in the same number of error messages.
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4.4 Cyberorgs
In this section, we introduce the implementation of cyberorgs. Cyberorgs, including cells and groups
in the system, are implemented using actors. Besides communication and negotiation, cyberorgs
have capabilities to settle their sending and receiving policies, to join and depart a group, and to
purchase e-pennies from their message handlers, etc.
4.4.1 Cells
A cell can be naturally implemented by an actor, which has a thread of execution and a message
buffer to receive messages. Each cell must have an associated message handler to send and receive
messages. To affiliate with a message handler, a cell must register itself to one by requesting a
message handler to accept it. Once receiving the registration request, the target message handler
adds the requester to its client pool. Afterwards, the cell can communicate with the external world
through its associated message handler.
In addition to sending and receiving messages, a cell needs to configure its policies, which are
stored on its local message handler. On the one hand, as a message sender, a cell can be a publisher.
A publisher provides messaging services to others. On the other hand, as a message recipient, a cell
can be a subscriber. A subscriber subscribes messaging services provided by publishers. Under the
publisher/subscriber circumstance, the subscriber should initiate a negotiation process to receive
messages.
If a cell run out of its eCash, it has to purchase some from its local message handler. Otherwise,
it can not send messages. When a cell intends to join or depart one of its parent groups, it sends
a request to its local message handler, which, in turn, processes the request on behalf of the cell.
We will discuss it in detail shortly.
4.4.2 Groups
Like a cell, a group must affiliate a message handler to interact with the external world. In order
to associate with a message handler, a group must register itself like a cell does. As communicating
entities, a group also holds sending and receiving policies, which are kept on its local message
handler.
A group may permit cells or other groups to join it or may allow its members to leave it. In
our implementation, these group primitives are carried out through the two APIs: joinAGroup and
departAGroup exposed by the group class. Because the members of a group is variable, the group
maintains a list to track its members.
Group members can use resources of their parent group. In our implementation, resources
that can be used directly are policies. In other words, a member can use policies of its parent
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Figure 4.4: A distributed group which has only one main message handler
group to make proposals or evaluate proposals. Group members use contracts of their parent group
indirectly.
A member can send messages through its parent group. Members can send two types of mes-
sages: personal messages and group messages. Because group members consume resources which
are stipulated by the contracts between them and their parent group, their parent group must have
a mechanism to impose constraints on its members to prevent its resources from being abused. To
achieve this goal, as we suggested in Chapter 3, a group restricts the maximum number of personal
messages that each member can send by setting message quotas. Each group member has a default
message quota. Furthermore, a member may have particular message quota for particular recipi-
ents. For example, Alice in the student group, which has a contract with the faculty group, can
send 10 messages to a recipient in the faculty group; however, her message quota maybe 20 when
a recipient is in the staff group. Hence, each group member may have multiple message quotas. A
group can configure arbitrarily complex message quota for each member. As long as the number of
messages have sent does not exceed its message quota, personal messages from that member will
be sent.
A member may issue a group message, which is stored in the outgoing message queue of the
parent group. Whether the group message is sent is determined by group message policies of the
parent group. For instance, a group message policy can be like: a group message can be sent if
more than fifty percent of group members accepts it. When a member sends a group message,
the message does not consume message quotas of that member. We will describe group message
policies further in Section 4.9.
As shown in Figure 4.4, a group may consists of members from multiple message handlers. In
this case, we say the group is a distributed group. Although a distributed group spans among
multiple message handlers, only one message handler, which is called its main message handler,
provides messaging services to the group.
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4.5 Message Handler
To interact with the external world, each communicating entity must have an associated message
handler. Besides providing communication services, a message handler also is responsible for main-
taining information for its clients, such as policies, contracts, eCash account, etc. In this section, we
delineate message handlers’ chores on managing clients’ information. The communication services
will be discussed in a separated Section 4.9. Message handlers are implemented using actors.
This section is organized as follows: Section 4.5.1 discusses the policy pool, which is used to
maintain clients’ policies. The contract pool, which is employed to manage clients’ contracts, is
described in Section 4.5.2. Each cyberorg has an eCash account, which is addressed in Section
4.5.3. Section 4.5.4 discusses how a message handler monitors behaviors of its clients; therefore the
message handler can make some decisions on behalf of its clients. How a message handler prevents
others from abusing its resources is illustrated in Section 4.5.5.
4.5.1 Policy Pool
A message handler manages a policy pool, which contains sending and receiving policies of its
clients. In addition to add and remove policies from the pool, the most important task of the
policy pool is to select a policy to make a proposal for senders or evaluate a proposal for recipients.
Upon accepting a message from its client, if the message does not consist of a proposal, the
local message handler generates a proposal for it automatically based on policies of the client. This
task is delegated to its policy pool. The interface used for this purpose in the implementation is as
follows:
public Proposal makePpl(String sender, String recipient)
The sender argument specifies the message sender, who has to make a proposal if there is
no available contract between the sender and the recipient. The recipient argument specifies
the message recipient. As we mentioned in Chapter 3, the sender prefers making a particular
proposal to making a general proposal if there is a particular sending policy for the recipient. If
the recipient parameter is presented, the makePpl method will choose a particular policy rather
than a general policy to make a proposal if there is a particular one.
When a recipient-side message handler receives a proposal from a sender, it delegates the evalu-
ation task to its policy pool, which selects a receiving policy according to the sender/recipient pair
and employ the selected policy to assess the proposal. The interface which carries out the task in
the implementation is:
public boolean checkPpl(String recipient, String sender, Proposal ppl)
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The sender and recipient arguments have the same meaning as in the method makePpl. The
ppl arguments specifies the proposal to be evaluated.
In our prototype implementation, policies have two categories: implicit policies and explicit
policies. Recipients or senders have implicit policies for handling individual incoming or outgoing
messages. These policies lead to implicit negotiations followed by implicit contracts for individual
messages with senders or recipients. Explicit policies are employed when a sender attempts to
construct a long-term relationship with a recipient; thus the sender does not need to negotiate with
the recipient for every message. These policies lead to explicit negotiations followed by explicit
contracts for multiple messages with recipients. An example of an implicit policy is: two e-pennies
for sending one message. “100 e-pennies for sending 60 messages” is an example of an explicit
policy. We will discuss implicit contracts and explicit contract in the next section.
4.5.2 Contract Pool
Recall that senders can offer implicit proposals using implicit policies. An acceptable implicit
proposal leads to a implicit contract, which is used only once. In our implementation, implicit
contracts are not stored in the contract pool because they are transient and only control one
message communication. An explicit contract is generated by a negotiation using explicit policies.
An explicit contract exists for a while to regulate subsequent communication between a sender and
a recipient. In the following, when we say contracts, we mean explicit contracts.
After a contract is generated, both the sender-side and the recipient-side message handlers holds
a copy of the contract, which is stored in their contract pools. Besides from storing contracts, a
contract pool is responsible for two important functions: contract-checking and contract-generating.
At the sender side, when a sender wants to send a message, the sender-side message handler
checks whether there is an existing contract between the sender and the recipient. If yes, the
message will be delivered using the existing contract. If not, the sender-side message handler will
activate a negotiation on behalf of the sender. The contract-checking assignment will be carried
out by its contract pool using the following interface:
public int checkContract(String sender, String recipient)
At the recipient side, if the message handler receives a normal message from a remote message
handler, the recipient-side message handler also needs to determine whether there is an existing
contract between the recipient and the sender. If yes, the message will be transmitted to the
recipient immediately. If not, the message will be discarded. If the message handler accepts
a request message from a remote message handler, it designates its contract pool to generate a
contract for the sender and the recipient. The generated contract is stored in both the recipient-
side and the sender-side message handler. A third copy is deposited in the CA for the accountability
purpose, which will be illustrated in Section 4.6. The contract-generating interface looks as follows:
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public Contract generateContract(RequestMsg rm)
The argument rm, which encapsulates a proposal, indicates that a contract is generated from a
request message. The request message also contains information of the sender.
4.5.3 eCash Account
Each cyberorg has an eCash account on its related message handler, which records the balance of
the account. When a cyberorg wants to purchase e-pennies, it issues a request to its associated
message handler. If the message handler has sufficient eCash, it will sell the requested number of
e-pennies to the intended cyberorg. Otherwise, the message handler will purchase e-pennies from
the CA and then sell them to the intended cyberorg.
Like a joint banking account in real world, an eCash account can be shared by multiple cyberorgs.
Each eCash account has a main owner. Joint owners can be added to the eCash account. In a
negotiation process, the sender designates which eCash account is used in its proposal. The eCash
account has capabilities to check if the claimed sender is permitted to use it or not.
4.5.4 Behavior Monitor
In the real world, people always make decisions based on their previous behaviors and acquired
knowledge. Similarly, in our prototype, cyberorgs need to know their previous behaviors to de-
termine how to interact with others in the future. Each cyberorg has its own policy for making
decisions. Policies used to monitor the behavior of cyberorgs are called trigger policies. An event
is triggered once a certain condition is satisfied, which is defined in a trigger policy. For example,
commonly, a sender may send messages to particular recipients regularly. To maximize its benefits,
the sender may negotiate a new contract with recipients when special conditions defined in their
trigger policies are satisfied.
To detect whether an event should be triggered, cyberorgs have to trace their own behavior,
whereas it is too trivial to be efficient. In our prototype, we warrant the message handlers to do
these chores for their clients. Trigger policies of a cyberorg are kept on its local message handler,
which monitors behaviors of its clients. For example, if a cyberorg holds a trigger policy like: if
I have sent 10 messages to Bob since yesterday, I would like to negotiate a contract with Bob,
which allows me to send him 20 messages per day. In this case, the message handler will start a
negotiation process with Bob provided that the regulated condition has been reached.
Implementation
Although the behavior monitor mechanism can detect any kinds of behavior of cyberorgs and can
make any kinds of event be triggered, in our implementation, we only allow message handlers
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representing their clients to initiate a negotiation.
As we mentioned in Section 4.5.1, cyberorgs has two types of sending policies: one type is implicit
and another type is explicit. If the sender wants to communicate with the recipient frequently, the
sender may be tired of using implicit policies for each communication, although it is the sender’s
message handler not the sender itself to start a negotiation process. In this case, the sender would
like construct a long-term relationship using explicit policies.
Each cyberorg has its own distinct trigger policies, which are kept on its associated message
handler. At the same time, a message handler also maintains a default trigger policy for its clients
in order to provide facilities to clients who do not possess their own trigger policies. Like sending
and receiving policies, trigger policies can be customized for particular cyberorgs.
In our implementation, the message handler counts the number of messages that the monitored
client has sent. If the number meets the defined number in the trigger policy, the message handler
will start a negotiation on behalf of the monitored client. For example, if Alice holds a trigger
policy like: If I have sent 10 messages to Bob, I would like to negotiate a contract with him. Under
this policy, when Alice’s message handler detects that the number of messages goes to Bob from
Alice surpasses 10, it will start a negotiation process automatically on behalf of Alice.
4.5.5 Penalties
As we suggested in the previous chapter, unacceptable proposals may cause unproductive com-
munication. In our prototype, it is message handler’s task to regulate the behavior of its clients.
The abnormal clients are punished by their local message handlers. In turn, an abnormal message
handler, which emits too many unacceptable proposals, is punished by other message handlers. To
achieve this goal, a message handler maintains two tables. One is the threshold table, which tracks
the number of unacceptable proposals that its clients can send. Another is the penalty table, which
records which clients and which message handlers have been punished or are being punished.
A message handler may customize special thresholds for an individual client in the threshold
table. For example, a message handler may allow one client to send 10 unacceptable proposals, but
does not permit another to send 5. Once the number of unacceptable proposals a client has sent
rises above its threshold, the client is put into the penalty table.
Each message handler has its own penalty policies. Members in the penalty table are punished
according to penalty policies. For example, if a penalty policy is: blocking any message, then
the message from the punishing member will be discarded by the message handler which holds this
policy. At the sender side, the message handler examines whether the sender is in the penalty table.
If yes, the message will be discarded; otherwise, the message will be delivered to the recipient-side
message handler. At the recipient side, the message handler determines whether the remote message
handler is in its own penalty table. If yes, any messages from the remote message handler will be
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discarded; otherwise, messages will be evaluated or be delivered to the recipient.
Penalty Implementation
We construct a penalty mechanism to discourage users from deliberately forging unacceptable
proposals. We implement two kinds of penalties to solve this problem: the financial penalty and the
temporary blocking penalty. Corresponding to the two penalties, we settle two types of thresholds:
the financial threshold and the temporary blocking threshold. In the following, we first describe
the financial penalty and the temporary blocking penalty on the message handler level. Finally, we
illustrate these two penalties on the system level.
Financial Penalty The first type of threshold is the financial threshold. We use tf to denote
it. If the number of refusal messages caused by a client beats tf , the message handler will catch
this event and punish the client by deducting some e-pennies from the client’s eCash account.
The message handler manages how many e-pennies should be decremented from the client’s eCash
account. Moreover, in a message handler, its clients may share a global tf or the message handler
may set up different financial penalties for different clients. In other words, clients may be punished
individually. For example, the message handler may want to give more financial penalty to clients
who make unacceptable proposals more frequently.
Temporary Blocking Penalty Another type of threshold is the temporary blocking threshold.
We denote it as tb. Generally, tb is greater than tf . When the total number of refusal messages
caused by a client surpasses tb, the message handler will block any messages from that client for a
limited time period t. After this time period expires, the client is eligible to send messages again.
However, if the same user continues to make unacceptable requests and the number of refusal
messages exceeds tb again, the message handler stop providing services to the client for a time
period 2× t. Next time will be 2× (2× t), and so on.
Like the financial threshold, the message handler holds a global tb for all its clients; however,
the message handler may also designate an individual value for a particular client. Again, the time
period t may be shared or individual.
Punishing Message Handlers In previous discussions, we elaborated how to block a malicious
cyberorg who purposely makes unacceptable requests on the message handler level. However, we
have another problem: what if a message handler does not control unacceptable requests from its
affiliated users? In this situation, the irresponsible message handler is punished by other message
handlers. Otherwise, if others allow the abnormal one to make unsatisfactory requests, the abnormal
one will waste resources of them, such as computational resources, memory, and network bandwidth.
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Hence, if a message handler does not control its abnormal clients, the reckless one will risk to be
penalized by others.
Message handlers use temporary blocking penalty rather than financial penalty to punish ab-
normal ones. A message handler may set a global temporary blocking threshold tb or set specific
tb for particular message handlers. Again, the blocking time period t may be shared or individual.
4.6 Central Authority
There is a third party called the central authority (CA) in the system. One purpose of the CA is
for issuing e-pennies. Only message handlers know the existence of the CA, which is transparent to
cyberorgs. Cyberorgs buy e-pennies from their affiliated message handlers, which, in turn, purchase
e-pennies from the CA.
Another purpose of the CA is for contract accountability. When a contract is produced by a
negotiation process, it is necessary to store a copy of the contract to the CA for the accountability
purpose to prevent the recipient and the sender from denying their responsibility.
4.6.1 eCash Account
Each message handler owns an eCash account on the CA. Recall that each cyberorg owns an eCash
account on its associated message handler. Unlike cyberorgs’ eCash account, a message handler’s
eCash account cannot be shared by multiple message handlers. The relationship between these two
different types of eCash account is described as follows:
Let us suppose the total amount of e-pennies of the CA has issued is S. There are m message
handlers in the system. The number of affiliated cyberorgs of jth message handler is n. Let us use
bij to denote the balance of the eCash account of ith cyberorg on its related message handler j, and
Bj to denote the balance of the eCash account of jth message handler on the CA. The number of
e-pennies which are not sold by jth message handler is denoted by ej . We have:
ej +
n∑
i=1
bij = Bj (4.1)
m∑
j=1
Bj = S (4.2)
From the equation 4.1 and equation 4.2, we can infer that when the balance of the eCash account
of a cyberorg is alternated by n e-pennies, the balance of the eCash account of its associated message
handler is also incremented or decremented by n correspondingly.
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4.7 Policy Selection
Recall that a cyberorg may have multiple sending and receiving policies. Conditions become more
complex when a cyberorg is a member of a group, which may be a member of another group. A
cyberorg can also use the policies of its parent group, even the policies of the parent group of its
parent group. The hierarchy of CyberOrgs brings a new problem: policy selection. For example,
Alice has her own sending and receiving policies. She also belongs to the Student group, which, in
turn, is a member of the University group. Each group has its own sending and receiving policies.
This situation brings a complicated problem: which policies should Alice adopt when she makes or
evaluates proposals.
In our implementation, the basic rule is that cyberorgs prefer particular policies to general
policies. In other words, as long as a cyberorg can find a particular policy, they will adopt the
particular one. Otherwise, the cyberorg will choose a general policy. In Section 4.7.1, we utilize an
example to illustrate our implemented selection strategy.
4.7.1 Policy Selection Example
We use Figure 4.5 as an example to elaborate our discussion. In Figure 4.5, a cyberorg c1 is a
member of two groups: g2 and g3. At the same time, g2 and g3 are located in a bigger group g1.
Figure 4.5: Policy selection example
Let’s suppose the cyberorg c1 intends to select a policy to interact with another cyberorg c2.
c1 holds some policies. Each group in the figure also possesses its own policies. The local message
handler of c1 selects a policy for c1 by carrying out the following steps:
1. Determining whether there is a particular policy for c2 in c1 ’s polices. If yes, the selecting
process is done and go to step 7.
2. Randomly selecting a group from g1, g2, and g3.
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3. Checking whether there is a specific policy for c2 in the chosen group’s policies. If yes, go to
step 7.
4. Choosing one of other groups and repeating step 3
5. Checking whether c1 has a global policy, if yes, go to step 7
6. Repeating step 5 using g1/g2/g3 1 instead of c1.
7. Completing the selection process.
In step 2, we randomly choose a group from three groups, because we intend to treat each group
equally. The policy selection strategy may be various in practice. Different users may have different
preferences when it comes to selecting a policy. For example, one cyberorg may use policies of its
parent group first and then choose its own policies. We only present one possible policy selection
strategy here. More interesting strategies need to be developed.
4.8 Policy Implementation
In this section, we discuss how our implementation separates policies from mechanisms and present
several policy examples to illustrate our solution. In Section 4.8.1, we expose the public policy
interface, which is used to develop novel policies. In Section 4.8.2, we present four policy examples
using pseudo-code to show developers how to develop a new policy.
4.8.1 Interface
To separate policies from mechanisms, we expose a public policy interface, which can make and
evaluate a proposal, to developers, who can create their own policies for their own or public purposes.
The public policy interface looks as follows:
public abstract class Policy implements Serializable {
int type; //The type of policy
int epennies; //Number of e-pennies
//Each policy can make a proposal
public abstract Proposal makePpl();
//Each policy can evaluate a proposal
public abstract boolean checkPpl(Proposal ppl);
}
1which means whatever order
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The above code snippet indicates that each policy possesses two fields and two methods. The
type field describes the type of the policy. The epennies field specifies the number of e-pennies.
The method makePpl can generate a proposal based on the policy. Whether a proposal is acceptable
is determined by the checkPpl method.
4.8.2 Implemented Policies
In this section, we present four policy examples. They are implicit policy, message policy, day
expiration policy, and message per minute policy.
Implicit Policy As we mentioned above, implicit policies regulate one message communication.
In our implementation, an implicit policy describes the price of one message. The code snippet
looks like as follows:
public class ImpPolicy extends Policy {
public boolean checkPpl(Proposal ppl) {
......
int proposedEp = get the number of e-pennies from the proposal;
if (proposedEp >= epennies)
return true;
return false;
}
public Proposal makePpl() {
ImpPpl ppl = new ImpPpl();
ppl.setEp(epennies);
return ppl;
}
}
To simplify our implementation, when making a proposal on behalf of its client, the policy will
use a called “lazy” strategy to parametrize the proposal. Like the above code, the policy uses its
“epennies” value to fill in the field of the made proposal rather than a value which is less than the
“epennies” value.
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Message Policy A message policy specifies that how many e-pennies should be provided to
compensate for a given number of messages. For example, “10 e-pennies for 10 messages” and “20
e-pennies for 10 messages” are message policies.
public class MsgPolicy extends Policy {
int nrMsgs; // The number of messages
public boolean checkPpl(Proposal p) {
......
int proposedEp = get the number of e-pennies from the proposal;
int proposedMsgs = get the number of messages from the proposal;
if ((proposedEp/proposedMsgs) >= (epennies/nrMsgs))
return true;
return false;
}
public Proposal makePpl() {
MsgPpl ppl = new MsgPpl();
ppl.setEp(ep);
ppl.setNumOfMsg(nrMsgs);
return ppl;
}
}
Day Expiration Policy An expiration policy controls that given a number of e-pennies, how
many days a sender can deliver messages to a recipient. A day expiration policy, such as “100 e-
pennies for 30 days,” indicates that the sender offers 100 e-pennies to send messages to the recipient
for 30 days or the recipient ask 100 e-pennies for receiving messages for 30 days.
public class DayPolicy extends Policy {
int nrDays;
public boolean checkPpl(Proposal p) {
int proposedEp = get the number of e-pennies from the proposal;
int proposedDays = get the number of days from the proposal;
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if ((proposedEp/proposedDays) >= (epennies/nrDays))
return true;
return false;
}
public Proposal makePpl() {
DayPpl dp = new DayPpl();
dp.setDays(nrDays);
dp.setType(type);
return dp;
}
Message Per Minute Policy Message per minute policy describes how many messages a sender
can send to a recipient per minute within a time period. For example, a message per minute policy
can be such as: “10 e-pennies for 2 messages per minute for 5 minutes”.
public class MinLtdMsgPolicy extends MsgPolicy {
int mins;
public boolean checkPpl(Proposal p) {
int proposedMins = get proposed minutes from the proposal;
int proposedMsgs = get the number of messages from the proposal;
int proposedEp = get the number of e-pennies from the proposal;
if ((proposedMins <= mins) && (proposedMsgs <= nrMsgs))
return true;
return false;
}
public Proposal makePpl() {
MinLtdMsgPpl ppl = new MinLtdMsgPpl();
ppl.setEp(ep);
ppl.setMins(mins);
ppl.setNumOfMsg(nrMsgs);
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return ppl;
}
}
The above policy implementation examples show us how policies are separated from mechanisms.
They also show developers how to implement their own policies. That is, developers must implement
checkPpl and makePpl methods.
4.8.3 Proposals
Notice that in each makePpl method above, the proposal is built from its corresponding policy. In
other words, for each policy, we can make a corresponding proposal. It is obvious that a message
policy cannot generate a day expiration proposal, and vice versa.
4.9 Communication
In this section, we narrate how cyberorgs interact with each other through message handlers and
how eCash flows among individual participants. As we mentioned, a sender can send personal
messages or group messages if it belongs to a group. We elaborate how to transmit these two types
of messages in Section 4.9.1 and Section 4.9.2 separately. Section 4.9.3 addresses what happens
when a recipient-side message handler receives a message from a remote message handler. The
detailed transaction is described in Section 4.9.4.
4.9.1 Personal Messages
A sender can deliver personal messages through two different ways. First, the sender itself can
transmit personal messages to the recipient. Secondly, the sender can transmit personal messages
through its parent group if it has one.
Let us see the first case in the first place. When a sender intends to transmit a message, the
complete message arrives at the sender’s local message handler first. Afterwards, the complete
message is deposited in the message list in its local message handler. Next, the message handler
carries out the following steps to accomplish the communication attempt:
• Checking whether the sender is in the penalty table. If yes, the message will be discarded
and the message handler relinquish the sending attempt.
• Checking whether there is a contract between the sender and the recipient. If yes, the message
will be delivered to the recipient-side message handler and return.
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• Checking whether there is a trigger policy whose condition is satisfied. If yes, the message
handler will select a explicit policy to make a proposal. Otherwise, the message handler will
select an implicit policy to make a proposal.
• Obtaining the eCash account which is responsible for paying for the message
• Retrieving the balance of the eCash account. If the funds are not sufficient, the message
handler will abandon this sending attempt.
• Sending a request message which encapsulates the generated proposal to the recipient-side
message handler and waiting for a response
• Receiving and checking the response message from the recipient-side message handler. If the
proposal is accepted, the complete message will be delivered and return.
• Checking whether the number of refusal messages has reached the penalty threshold. If yes,
the sender will be inserted into the penalty table.
For the second case, the personal message is stored into the outgoing message queue of its
parent group. Recall that cyberorgs cannot communicate with each other directly. Associated
message handlers provide messaging services to them. Therefore, the message goes to the parent
group through the following path: the sender’s local message handler → the group’s main message
handler → the group. Whether the message is sent is determined by two factors:
• there is an existing contract between the group and the recipient, and
• the sender does not run out of its message quota.
We should notice that if the first condition is not met, the arrival of the personal message makes
the group trigger a negotiation process.
4.9.2 Group Messages
If a sender wants to send a group message which represents its parent group, the message will be
stored in the outgoing message queue of its parent group. Other members of the same group can
vote on the message. The voting result determines whether the message is sent or not. The group
evaluates the result of vote based on its group message policies and makes a final determination.
In our implementation, we developed two types of group message policies: coauthor policy and
committee policy. We call messages using a coauthor policy coauthor messages and messages using
a committee policy committee messages in the following. A coauthor message has multiple authors.
In other words, besides from the first author (initiator), a coauthor message has one or more
coauthors. The coauthor message will be sent to the recipient if and only if all coauthors accept it.
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A committee message belongs to a committee which is comprised of several members. Each member
in the committee can vote on it. The committee message also has a property which describes under
what condition the message is to be sent. For example, the condition may be how many percents
of the committee members consent the message or how many committee members should agree on
sending the message. We expose the public group message policy interface, thus, developers can
develop their own group message policies.
In our implementation, to send a group message, the initiator composes and transmits the mes-
sage to its parent group through its related message handler. The group message is stored in the
outgoing message queue of the group. Then, the group sends a query message to all involved coau-
thors or committee members, which are members of the group. Next, the group waits for response
from related participants. The coauthor message will be delivered provided that all coauthors have
accepted it. The committee message will be transmitted as long as conditions defined in the com-
mittee policy is true. For example, if there are five members in a committee, the definition of a
committee policy can be “at least three members in the committee should accept the message”.
Once three members have acknowledged the message, the committee message will be transferred.
Interchanging group messages among cyberorgs introduces a new communication pattern: many-
to-one. Here “many” represents a group of senders, and “one” means a recipient. When a recipient
is also a group, a variable pattern, many-to-many, is introduced.
4.9.3 Message Receiving
In our prototype, a recipient may receive two types of messages from a sender: request messages and
normal messages. When receiving a message from remote message handlers, the message handler of
the recipient examines the type of the message. If the message is a request message, it determines
whether the proposal attached with the request message is acceptable based on the recipient’s
policies if any. If the proposal is acceptable, a contract will be generated. A copy of the contract
will be sent to the CA and to the remote message handler. Otherwise, the message handler will
transmit a refusal message to the sender on behalf of the recipient. If there is no policy related
to the recipient on it, the message handler will transfer the request message to the recipient, who
makes the final decision on whether accepting the proposal or not.
If the message is a normal message, the message handler checks whether the remote message
handler is in its penalty table. If yes, the message will be abandoned. Next, it checks whether there
is an existing contract between the sender and the recipient. If yes, the message will be delivered
to the recipient. Otherwise, the message will be discarded right away.
At the sender side, a sender may receive refusal messages from a recipient. In this case, the
recipient or its message handler sends a response message to the sender-side message handler. The
response message suggests whether the sender’s proposal is accepted or not. If the response message
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is a refusal message, the sender-side message handler will try to make a better proposal on behalf
of the sender. If the sender-side message handler cannot generate a better proposal, the refusal
message will be sent to the sender and let the sender make a final decision: offering a better proposal
or abandoning communication attempt with the recipient.
4.9.4 Transactions
To reach a contract, the sender needs to pay eCash to compensate the recipient for its mailbox
consumption. In this transaction, eCash flows from the sender to the recipient. To maintain the
consistency of equation 4.1 and equation 4.2, the same amount of eCash also flows from the sender-
side message handler to the recipient-side message handler. In other words, in a communication
process, modifying an eCash account of a cyberorg causes three other eCash account to be changed.
They are accounts of both message handlers and the account of another participant. The same
discussion also applies to the publisher-subscriber pattern; however, in this case, the subscriber is
the negotiation initiator and the publisher receives e-pennies.
Cyberorgs can purchase e-pennies from their associated message handlers, which, in turn, pur-
chase e-pennies from the CA. In this transaction, eCash flows from the CA to the eCash account of
the message handlers. In the meanwhile, the same amount of eCash flows from the eCash account
of the message handlers to the eCash account of the buyers.
To prevent false contracts, the contract is generated in the recipient-side message handler. Upon
being generated, the recipient-side message handler sends one copy to the sender-side message
handler and one copy to the CA, respectively. After receiving the copy of the contract, the sender-
side message handler also send a request to the CA to add the same contract. The CA add the
contract if and only if it receives two requests: one is from the sender-side message handler and
another is from the recipient-side message handler. Otherwise, the system provides senders an
opportunity to add false contracts. Likewise, the CA will delete a contract if and only if it receives
one request from the sender-side message handler and one request from the recipient-side message
handler.
4.10 Deployment
The core of our implementation is message handlers, which can correspond to real email servers. In
Section 4.10.1, we study three possible scenarios in which message handlers can be applied. Message
handlers can be deployed incrementally in the Internet, which is discussed in Section 4.10.2.
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4.10.1 Scenarios of Using Message Handlers
Message handlers can be used in three possible ways to reduce spam, including independent email
clients, plug-ins of current email clients or current email servers, and email servers. In the following,
we use an email client as an example to illustrate how to use message handlers in real world. Usages
as plug-ins or email servers are similar.
Message handlers can be used as an independent email client program. When a message arrives
at an email client running on a computer, the email client checks whether there is an attached
proposal with the incoming message. If there is an attached proposal, it assesses the proposal
based on policies which has already been deposited on it by users. If the proposal is accepted, the
message will be stored into the local inbox folder. Otherwise, the email client will automatically
send the message sender a short message that asks the sender to make a better proposal. If there
is no attached proposal, the email client checks whether there is an existing contract with the
sender. If yes, the message will be stored into the local inbox folder. Otherwise, the email client
assumes that the message comes from an email server or email client which is not compatible with
it. Whether the message is accepted or not can be determined by other approaches, such as filters.
When the email client sends a message, it checks whether there is an existing contract with the
recipient. If there is one contract, the email client knows that the recipient uses the same type of
email systems. Otherwise, the email client will attach a proposal with the outgoing message and
send it. If recipients use traditional email systems, the recipient can ignore the attached proposal.
Otherwise, if recipients use our email clients, they can process messages using our mechanism.
We can develop an email client program based on the above discussion and allow it to be
downloadable. To be used effectively, the program must present a user-friendly user interface to
make users customize their policies easily.
4.10.2 Incremental Deployment
In this section, we discuss how to deploy message handlers incrementally. In our discussion, message
handlers are considered as email servers.
When sending a message, a message handler sends it with a proposal if there is no existing
contract between a sender and a recipient. If a recipient-side system is a current email system, it
ignores the attached proposal. If the recipient-side system is a message handler, the message can
be handled using our mechanism.
As a recipient, a message handler checks whether there is a proposal attached with the incoming
message. If yes, the message handler realize that the incoming message is sent by another message
handler. In this case, the message is processed using our mechanism. If there is no attached
proposal, the message handler determines whether there is an existing contract between the message
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sender and the recipient. If no contract exists, the message handler assumes that the incoming
message is sent by a traditional email system. In this case, the incoming message is checked by
other techniques, such as filters [54, 20] or tarpits [14, 17].
Through the above description, we know that message handlers can be deployed incrementally
in the Internet. After more message handlers are deployed, a message handler can work more
effectively.
4.11 Chapter Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, we present a prototype implementation of the ownership-based message admission
control mechanism discussed in the previous chapter. In our implementation, cyberorgs, which are
communicating entities, are implemented using actors. Rather than communicating each other di-
rectly, cyberorgs interact with each other through their associated message handlers, which provide
messaging services to cyberorgs. We introduce a central authority, which issues eCash and ensures
the accountability of contracts.
In addition to facilitating communication, a message handler maintains information of its clients,
including policies, contracts, eCash accounts, and trigger policies. An eCash account can be shared
by multiple cyberorgs. To avoid being overwhelmed by refusal messages, each message handler
manages a penalty table, which records abnormal message handlers and its abnormal clients. En-
tities in the penalty table are punished through either financial penalties or temporary blocking
penalties.
eCash is not real money although it can be. In our implementation, a buyer does nothing more
than only sending a request to its related message handler to purchase e-pennies. Upon receiving
the request, the message handler deposits the required number of e-pennies into the buyer’s eCash
account. In real implementations, eCash can be made through multiple ways, such as solving
CAPTCHAs [59] or computing a challenge. In this case, the central authority is a server which
issues CAPTCHAs or challenges and authenticates the answers. eCash also can be purchased from
the central authority using real money. In our implementation, we do not provide a mechanism
to authenticate eCash. However, eCash authentication is one of most serious security problems
in practice. For example, malicious hackers may commit to forge e-pennies. Thus, the central
authority must provide authentication services in real systems.
We introduce group concept corresponding to organizations in human society. Groups can
control consumption of their resources. A group member can use policies of its parent group. In
Section 4.7, we present our policy selection strategy. However, in practice, individual users can
have different preferences when choosing a policy. For example, Alice may choose a policy from
one of her parent groups first instead of hers. A group uses message quota mechanism to restrict
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its members’ communication behavior. A group message has a relevant group message policy. A
group message can be sent as long as the condition defined in its relevant group message policy is
satisfied.
We address four examples of policies in Section 4.8. Developers can develop more useful and
interesting policies by extending our public policy interface. Policies can be arbitrarily complex.
By employing the policy interface, we separate policies from mechanisms.
Our approach is not a complete solution to spam problems. By contrast, this approach is an
complement of existing approaches. In our approach, we do not classify whether a message is spam
or a regular email. Thus, our approach precludes false positives, which are major problems of filters,
which are widely deployed at present. In our approach, as long as spammers are willing to send
spam, they must negotiate contracts with recipients. The contracts stipulate the cost of sending
messages.
58
Chapter 5
Analysis and Experimental Results
In our approach, we add a negotiation process into normal communication to control message
admission. Since negotiation introduces computation and communication overhead, in this chapter,
we construct analytical models to analyze our prototype system and design and carry out a series
of experiments to validate our analytical results.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence that as long as we design policies carefully, a
negotiation system has almost the same message processing capacity as a current email system. In
this chapter, we examine the system in three scenarios. They are when the sender sends messages
directly to the recipient, when the sender sends messages using implicit policies, and when the
sender sends messages using explicit policies. To simplify our discussion, when a system is in the
first scenario, we call the system the direct system. We call the last two the implicit policy system
(IP) and the explicit policy system (EP), respectively. An IP system is a system with negotiation
using implicit policies. An EP system is a system with negotiation using explicit policies. An IP
system or an EP system is called a system with negotiation (SN). In the following, we use SN
systems to represent IP systems and EP systems if we do not need to distinguish them from each
other.
In an SN system, the analysis of a recipient-side message handler is straightforward. For exam-
ple, on receiving a message, if there is an existing contract between the sender and the recipient,
the message handler will deliver the message to the recipient; otherwise, the message handler will
discard the message. Thus, in this chapter, we only focus on analyzing sender-side message han-
dlers. In the following, when we say “message handler” or “sender,” we mean “sender-side message
handler” unless we specifically add “recipient-side” before “message handler.”
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 constructs analytical models based
on queuing theory and presents analytical results. In Section 5.2, we design and carry out several
experiments to validate our analytical results. Finally, the last section summarizes this chapter.
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5.1 Analytical Models
In this section, we construct analytical models to analyze how negotiation impacts on system
performance. In Section 5.1.1, we briefly introduce the queuing theory [36], which is used to build
and analyze our analytical models. In Section 5.1.2 and Section 5.1.3, we analyze our system from
the processor and network perspectives.
5.1.1 Queuing theory
In this section, we concisely introduce queuing theory [28] and notations used in our analysis. In
the queuing theory, the following quantities are measured:
λ, the job arrival rate
R, the average response time, that is, the time interval between arrival time and departure time
S, the average service requirement
W, the average waiting time, that is, the time interval between arrival time and the instant
beginning to receive service
U, the utilization of the system
N, the number of jobs in the system including jobs waiting to receive service and jobs receiving
service
Additionally, following equations hold true:
R =W + S (5.1)
W = N ∗ S (5.2)
N = λ ∗R (5.3)
and
U = λ ∗ S (5.4)
Equation 5.1 shows that the average response time is equal to the sum of the average waiting
time and the average service requirement. When a job arrives, its average waiting time is equal
to the product of the number of jobs in the system and the average service requirement (as shown
in equation 5.2). Equation 5.3 and Equation 5.4 are the Little’s law and the utilization law, re-
spectively. The assumption under which these two laws are made is that jobs are not lost due to
insufficient buffers. Under this circumstance, the throughput of a system is equal to the job arrival
rate of the system. The Little’s law describes that the average number of jobs in a system is equal
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to the product of the job arrival rate and the average response time. The utilization law means that
the utilization of a system is equal to the product of the job arrival rate and the average service
requirement in that system.
In the rest of this section, we employ the above notations and equations to analyze our prototype
system. When it comes to describing a direct system, we add a subscript d to the notations, such
as λd. Likewise, we add a subscript s to the notations to represent a quantity in an SN system.
5.1.2 Processor Analysis
In the processor analysis, we analyze the utilization of an SN system. Figure 5.1 shows the observed
system.
Figure 5.1: The observed system - message handler
In our analysis, we assume that senders have sufficient eCash so that they do not need to
purchase e-pennies, which causes extra communication and computation. Another assumption is
that senders always make acceptable proposals. So there is no error messages in the system. To
describe our system more accurately, we define the following additional quantities:
Sc, the average service requirement when there is an existing contract in the system
Sn, the average service requirement when there is no existing contract in the system
Pc, the probability that there is an existing contract in the system
Pn, the probability that there is no existing contract in the system
From these measurements, we can define the average service requirement for an SN system:
Ss = Pc × Sc + Pn × Sn (5.5)
Obviously, the average service requirement of an IP system is Ss = Sn.
Utilization Analysis
We determine how negotiation impacts the system utilization. To achieve this goal, we measure
that when direct and SN systems have the same utilization, what message arrival rate these two
systems respectively have.
λdSd = λsSs (5.6)
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Combined with the equation 5.5, we have:
λd
λs
=
Pc × Sc + Pn × Sn
Sd
(5.7)
From the equation 5.7, we can infer that when both systems have the same utilization, the ratio
of the message arrival rates is Pc×Sc+Pn×SnSd . Notice that Pc + Pn = 1 and Sn ≥ Sc ≥ Sd. We
can further conclude that if a direct system has the same utilization as an SN system, its message
arrival rate is higher.
Response Time Analysis
Figure 5.2: Processor response time analysis - a direct system
In a direct system, response time is the time interval between the arrival time (t1) and the
departure time (t2). This time interval consists of two ingredients: one is the waiting time, and
another is the service requirement. As shown in Figure 5.2, the response time can be expressed as
follows:
Rd = t2 − t1 (5.8)
The analysis of response time is more complex for an SN system. Illustrated in Figure 5.3, if
there is an existing contract between the sender and the recipient, the response time is Rn = t2−t1.
If there is no existing contract, the response time consists of three parts:
• Ta, the time interval between the message arrival time and the time when a corresponding
request message is sent
• Tw, the time interval between the time when a request message is sent and the time when the
corresponding response message is received
• Tl, the time interval between the time when the corresponding response message is received
and the message departure time
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Further, Tw includes a round-trip network latency, denoted by TD, and the recipient thinking
time: Trt = t4 − t3. Summarizing the above analysis, the processor response time of an SN system
is:
Rs = Pc × Ta + Pn × (Ta + TD + Trt + Tl) (5.9)
Notice that Pc + Pn = 1, the above equation can be simplified as follows:
Rs = Ta + Pn × (TD + Trt + Tl) (5.10)
From the equations 5.10 and 5.8, we can conclude that when Pn is significantly small, the
average response time of an SN system is almost the same as the average response time of a direct
system. In other words, if a sender needs to negotiate a contract more frequently, the average
response time of an SN system will increase. Thus, the response time is policy-dependent in an SN
system.
Figure 5.3: Processor response time analysis - an SN system
5.1.3 Network Analysis
In our network analysis, the observed system is a network connection, illustrated in Figure 5.4.
The following quantities are measured:
Sa, the average service requirement of application messages
Se, the average service requirement of service messages
Pc, the probability that there is an existing contract in the system
Pn, the probability that there is no existing contract in the system
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Figure 5.4: The observed system: network connection
In an SN system, when sending a message, if there is no existing contract between a sender
and a recipient, three messages should be processed, including the normal message, one request
message, and one response message. We call normal messages application messages and the last two
messages service messages in our analysis. Compared to variable length of application messages,
the length of service messages is almost constant for all application messages. Hence, we assume
that the average service requirement of service messages is the same. Therefore, the average service
requirement for an SN system is as follows.
Ss = Pc × Sa + Pn × (Sa + 2Se) (5.11)
We should notice that the sum of Pc and Pn is 1, thus the above equation becomes
Ss = Sa + 2Pn × Se (5.12)
Moreover, the average service requirement for a direct system is:
Sd = Sa (5.13)
Network Utilization
Similar to the utilization analysis of processors, we assume that the utilization of an SN system is
the same as the utilization of a direct system. Combined the equation 5.6 with the equations 5.12
and 5.13, we have:
λd
λs
= 1 +
2Pn × Se
Sa
(5.14)
From the above equation, we can infer that when both systems have the same utilization, the
ratio of the message arrival rates is 1 + 2Pn×SeSa .
Compared to the average service requirement of normal messages, the average service require-
ment of extra messages is smaller. Therefore, if Pn is very small, the fraction 2Pn×SeSa can be
ignored. This means that when the probability that there is no existing contract in the system is
significantly small, the network utilization of both systems is almost the same.
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Network Response Time
In a direct system, the network response time of a message is the sum of the message service
requirement and the network latency1, denoted by TD in this thesis. Hence, the network average
response time of a direct system is:
Rd = Sa + TD (5.15)
In an SN system, if there is no existing contract between a sender and a recipient, a message will
not be sent until a negotiation process completes and a contract is reached. If there is an existing
contract, the message will be sent right away. Thus, the network average response time can be
expressed as follows:
Rs = Pc × (Sa + TD) + Pn × (Sa + 2× Se + 3× TD) (5.16)
Because of Pc + Pn = 1, the above equation can be simplified as:
Rs = Sa + TD + 2× Pn × (Se + TD) (5.17)
From the above equation, we can conclude that if Pn is trivial, the part “2× Pn × (Se + TD)”
becomes insignificant, the network average response time of an SN system will be almost the same as
the network average response time of a direct system. Put differently, the network average response
time of an SN system depends on the probability that there is an existing contract between the
sender and the recipient. This probability, in turn, is dependent on policies.
5.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we present our experimental results. We carry out experiments and compute
system utilization and system performance of our prototype system. We use simulated fixed-length
messages to examine our system. Two assumptions are made. One is that senders have sufficient
eCash; and another is that senders always make acceptable proposals.
In our system, per message overhead is significant; but per user overhead or per node overhead
may be insignificant. In other words, our system may not affect per user overhead or per node
overhead considerably; but influences per message overhead significantly. Therefore, our experi-
ments focus on examine per message overhead instead of per user or per node overhead. The same
discussion applies to system workload. This means our system may not affect per user workload or
per node workload.
This section is organized as follows: Section 5.2.1 addresses how to compute the system process-
ing time, system busy time, and system utilization. The rest of this section discusses experimental
results and our analysis.
1Here, network latency is one-way delay, not round-trip
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Figure 5.5: Communication pattern in an SN system
5.2.1 Analysis
When a message arrives at a direct system or an SN system which has an existing contract between
a sender and a recipient, the service requirement is the time interval between the arrival time
and the departure time. However, if a message arrives at an SN system which does not have a
contract between the sender and the recipient, the service requirement for this message includes two
time intervals: the interval between the arrival time and the time when the corresponding request
message is sent; and the interval between the time when the corresponding response message is
received and when it departs. We use ta to denote the first interval and tl to denote the second
interval. Figure 5.5 illustrates this scenario.
Thus, the service requirement for this message is:
Sn = ta + tl (5.18)
Suppose that the number of messages that has been sent within the observed time period T is
C. The observed time period T is the time interval between the first message arrival time and the
last message departure time. If the time intervals for the ith message are denoted by tai and tli .
Hence, an SN system busy time is:
B =
C∑
i=1
tai +
C∑
i=1
tli =
C∑
i=1
(tai + tli) (5.19)
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Figure 5.6: Communication pattern of an IP system
According to the queuing theory, the system utilization is:
U =
B
T
(5.20)
Thus, within the observed time period T, the system utilization is:
U =
∑C
i=1(tai + tli)
T
(5.21)
For a direct system, each message service requirement does not include the second time interval,
thus
Ud =
∑C
i=1 tai
T
(5.22)
In an IP system, the communication pattern can be depicted in Figure 5.6. The figure indicates
that each message needs a negotiation process. Thus, a system utilization of an IP system can be
expressed using equation 5.21.
In an EP system, the communication pattern is shown in Figure 5.7. The busy time is:
Be = Pc ×
C∑
i=1
tai + Pn ×
C∑
i=1
(tai + tli) (5.23)
Notice Pc + Pn = 1, the above equation becomes:
Be =
C∑
i=1
tai + Pn ×
C∑
i=1
tli (5.24)
Thus, the system utilization of an EP system is:
Ue =
∑C
i=1 tai + Pn ×
∑C
i=1 tli
T
(5.25)
In an EP system, when a message arrives, if there is no existing contract in the system, this
message triggers a negotiation process. Following messages have to wait until the negotiation
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Figure 5.7: Communication pattern of an EP system
process completes and a contract is reached. If they do not wait, each message will trigger a
negotiation process, which is not the negotiation purpose. However, in the Actor Architecture,
actors cannot be suspended except by the Actor platform. Therefore, in our experiments, when
we examine an EP system, if a message arrives and there is no existing contract at that instant
time, the sender will stop sending messages for a while. This time period must guarantee that the
negotiation process can complete. In our experimental environment, we choose this time period as
300 milliseconds.
Experiments for examining system utilization, busy time, and processing time are based on the
above analysis. Experiments for examining processor response time are based on the analysis in
Section 5.1.2.
5.2.2 Experiment Environments
We carry out experiments on two computers. Each computer runs an actor platform. Each actor
platform has one message handler and one cell. In our experiments, one cell as a sender delivers
messages to another, which plays the recipient role. The sender runs on a laptop computer, which
has an Intel P4 1.9 GHz CPU and 768MB memory. The recipient runs on a desktop computer,
which has an Intel Core Duo 1.86 GHz CPU and 2GB memory. Both computers run Ubuntu Linux
7.04.
In the following figures and tables, prefixes D, IP, and EP have the following meaning:
• D means a direct system.
• IP means an IP system
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• EP means an EP system.
The suffix 0S means a sender sends messages without any delay. In other words, we allow
the sender to send messages as fast as possible. 1S means the sender sends a message every 1
millisecond. The 100 or 200 means frequency of negotiating a contract, such as 100 means every
100 messages and 200 means every 200 messages. For example, EP0S-100 means that in an EP
system, the sender sends messages as fast as possible; and every 100 messages, the sender needs to
negotiate a contract.
5.2.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present experimental results related to system utilization, total processing time,
busy time, and response time.
Utilization
The data collected from the experiments is presented in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.8. As shown in
Figure 5.8, system utilization decreases as message arrival rate decreases. When the sender sends
messages as fast as possible, the utilization of direct systems is higher than the utilization of SN
systems. This is because we do not control the message arrival rate, the operating system job
scheduling takes time.
When the system sends a message every 1 millisecond, the IP system has the highest utiliza-
tion. This is consistent with our analysis. Considering an inserted 300 milliseconds delay for each
negotiation when we carry out EP0S-100 and EP0S-200 experiments, it is not surprising that the
utilization of EP systems is lower than the utilization of IP systems. If we deduct delays from the
EP system, the utilization of EP systems is higher than the utilization of the direct system, which
is also consistent with our analysis.
The utilization decreases as the number of messages increases, but not much, which is also due
to the operating system job scheduling.
Processing Time
The total processing time is the time interval between the first message arrival time and the final
message departure time. The experimental data is shown in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.9. As shown
in the figure, the total processing time of each system appears to be linear with the number of
messages. Obviously, the total processing time increases as the message arrival rate decreases.
Considering the added delays, it is not surprising that the experiments with EP1S-100 has the
biggest total processing time, because in comparison to the EP1S-200, EP1S-100 has more inserted
delays. However, after we deduct these delays, the total processing time of EP1S-100 and EP1S-200
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of the system utilization
Table 5.1: Experimental data on system utilization
Messages D0S D1S IP0S IP1S EP0S-100 EP1S-100 EP0S-200 EP1S-200
1000 32.78 10.69 25.67 15.91 22.55 6.17 35.33 7.48
2000 32.33 8.55 24.57 15.24 17.5 5.82 29.44 6.63
3000 36.48 7.1 24.49 13.73 15.84 5.81 27.98 5.45
4000 35.39 6.22 24.41 13.28 15.28 4.84 26.18 5.7
5000 35.76 6.73 25.16 13.09 14.84 4.75 25.71 6.1
6000 35.77 5.86 25.74 12.62 14.2 4.75 23.48 5.31
7000 34.74 6.22 25.08 12.07 12.93 4.41 24.7 4.86
8000 35.04 6.13 24.15 12.32 12.94 4.63 23.78 5.11
9000 35.19 6.01 23.87 11.92 13.26 4.37 24.12 5.3
10000 35.93 5.99 24.82 11.86 13.06 4.28 22.36 4.96
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of the processing time I: the processing time that a system
takes when processing a given number of messages
is between the total processing time of IP1S and the total processing time of D1S. In terms of total
processing time, the percentage difference from D1S to IP1S is up to 4.7%. In other words, if users
using our system still want to obtain the same message processing capacity as a direct system, the
users must own or purchase a computer which has a 1.99 GHz CPU approximately (Recall that we
used a 1.9 GHz CPU computer to carry out experiments).
Figure 5.9 also shows that as frequency of negotiation increases, total processing time increases
as well provided that other conditions are the same. We can conclude that the total processing
time is dependent on policies.
Figure 5.10 is an inverse version of Figure 5.9. It shows that how many messages a system can
handle given an amount of processor time. Obviously, using the same amount of processor time, a
direct system can process more messages than others; and an IP system processes fewer messages.
Busy Time
Figure 5.11 and Table 5.3 illustrate system busy time. Similar to the total processing time, the
system busy time of each system appears to be linear as the number of messages increases. The SN
system keeps the processor busier than the direct system. It is obvious that IP0S has the longest
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Table 5.2: Experimental data on total processing time: Time is millisecond
Messages D0S D1S IP0S IP1S EP0S-100 EP1S-100 EP0S-200 EP1S-200
1000 2208 8099 7488 8481 6467 11290 3981 9683
2000 3559 16118 13686 16480 12102 22237 7323 19283
3000 4544 24123 19682 24953 17953 33517 10921 28879
4000 5660 32061 25852 32962 23578 44465 13970 38286
5000 6762 40053 31367 40990 29432 55492 17545 47846
6000 7891 47986 37120 49113 34794 66547 20834 57463
7000 9178 56029 43160 56873 40853 77585 24274 66945
8000 10359 64049 49623 65338 46843 88589 27556 76362
9000 11236 72059 55763 73391 52595 99657 31175 85944
10000 12383 80016 61681 81352 57967 110748 34235 95558
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of the processing time II: the number of messages that
a system can handle given an amount of processor time
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of the system busy time
busy time provided that other conditions are the same. As the message arrival rate decreases,
the system busy time will decrease as well. Like total processing time, system busy time is also
policy-dependent.
Response Time
Figure 5.12 shows the relationship between the frequency of negotiation and the response time. The
number on the x-axis means the frequency of negotiation. For example, 100 means a negotiation
process is needed for every 100 messages. We carry out 12 experiments to compare response time
under different conditions. The collected data is listed in the Table 5.4. In each experiment, the
sender sends 1,000 messages to the recipient. The figure indicates that as the ratio of message to
contract increases, the response time of a negotiation system decreases.
We should notice that when a negotiation occurs every 25 or more messages, response time of
negotiation systems is almost stable and it decreases asymptotically close to direct systems. This
means that if we design our policies carefully, a system with negotiation can have minimal overhead
in terms of response time.
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Table 5.3: Experimental data on system busy time: Time is millisecond
Messages D0S D1S IP0S IP1S EP0S-100 EP1S-100 EP0S-200 EP1S-200
1000 723 865 1928 1353 1458 696 1456 725
2000 1153 1376 3363 2513 2121 1295 2156 1278
3000 1657 1714 4819 3427 2846 1949 3050 1574
4000 2003 1996 6310 4376 3602 2150 3661 2183
5000 2417 2698 7895 5365 4368 2637 4510 2918
6000 2823 2811 9554 6196 4942 3160 4894 3050
7000 3188 3488 10828 6867 5284 3419 5996 3254
8000 3631 3932 11984 8054 6063 4101 6555 3898
9000 3952 4332 13311 8746 6972 4358 7503 4558
10000 4450 4791 15314 9649 7571 4739 7651 4744
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Figure 5.12: The response time vs. frequency of negotiation
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Table 5.4: Frequency of negotiation vs. Response time: Time is millisecond
Messages/Contract Response time
1 34.045
2 7.653
10 2.459
25 1.52
50 1.155
75 1.149
100 1.035
125 0.987
150 0.95
175 0.954
200 0.936
Direct System 0.75
System Overhead
We compute system overhead in terms of the number of extra messages, which include request
messages, response messages, and system messages. In this discussion, the system includes both
the sender-side message handler and the recipient-side message handler.
According to the discussion in Section 4.9.4, in an IP system, to send a message, 2 extra messages
are generated in addition to one request message and one response message. These messages are
responsible for updating the eCash accounts. In an EP system, besides one request message and
one response message, 4 more extra messages are introduced. 2 of them modify eCash accounts
and another two messages add a contract. Therefore, in an IP system, the extra messages are
4n if the number of normal messages is n. In an EP system, the extra messages are 6n if the
number of negotiation is n. However, if a contract expires, the system will generate two more extra
messages to delete the contract in the CA. The above analysis indicates that the system overhead is
policy-dependent. More specifically, the fewer the number of negotiation times, the less the system
overhead.
5.3 Discussion
In this chapter, although we carry out experiments on two computers (users), experimental results
may be meaningful to multiple computers (users), because, in our system, system performance is
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not related to the number of users in systems, but is related to the number of messages. On the
other hand, more users in our system do not imply more messages. For instance, some users may
send messages frequently, but others do not. Thus, the scalability of our system is not affected by
the number of users in system. Moreover, in real deployment, our system can work as a plug-in of
current email systems, leading our system to probably have the same scalability of current systems.
Our experiments do not study human user effort when human users use our system. Here, we
discuss how our system may affect human user effort in real deployment. In direct systems, users
do not need to install policies and purchase eCash; but they have to delete spam manually. Users
using our system need to install policies and purchase eCash; However, usually, policies are installed
when users start to use our system and they are not change frequently. eCash can be purchased
in bulk. Hence, compared to spam deleting time, the time that human users should take maybe
constant. Furthermore, installing policies and purchasing eCash can be completed by our systems
automatically.
One limitation of our experiments is that simulated workload is used to examine our systems.
However, we can analyze our system using real email workload when they are deployed. Starting
from one node, we can deploy our system incrementally and examine workload of each node.
Moreover, we can analyze how our systems help reduce spam effectively when they are widely
deployed.
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we employ the queuing theory to examine our prototype system discussed in the
previous chapter. We construct analytical models to understand our implementation. Experiments
are carried out using simulated workload to determine the system performance and check the
accuracy of analytical models.
Through our analysis and experiments, we demonstrate that the system performance is policy-
dependent, including utilization, busy time, processing time, and response time. It provides ev-
idence to encourage users to design policies carefully in order to reduce negotiation. Moreover,
the system busy time and system processing time increase linearly with the number of messages.
This feature indicates if message service providers using our system attempt to improve system
throughput, they must invest more on better performance computers.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter makes a conclusion for this work and briefly introduces our future work.
6.1 Conclusion
Current email infrastructure does not enable recipients to control their mailbox consumption. More-
over, it does not restrict senders to deliver messages either. Our work intends to fill in this gap
through introducing negotiation.
The purpose of this work is to provide a flexible mechanism to reduce spam and expose a public
police interface to allow developers to develop customized policies. We construct an ownership-based
message admission control mechanism for curbing spam by specializing the CyberOrgs model, which
is a model for resource control in multi-agent systems. In our work, communicating entities are
represented by cyberorgs. A mailbox, which is considered as a private resource of its owner, can
be controlled in the boundary of a cyberorg. A sender obtains permission to access a recipient’s
mailbox through negotiation. In a negotiation process, a sender builds a proposal according to
its own policies and submits it to the recipient. The recipient evaluates the proposal based on its
own policies to determine whether the proposal is accepted. If the proposal is approved, a contract
is generated, which regulates the following communication between the sender and the recipient.
Otherwise, a refusal message is sent to the sender. A contract help the sender and the recipient
construct a long-term relationship.
We build a prototype implementation in this work. We implement a negotiation mechanism
and four policy examples. A public policy interface is exposed to programmers to allow them
to develop more interesting policies. In our prototype implementation, we consider a possible
security problem, in which malicious attackers may raise a large number of unacceptable proposals
that waste resources. Our system counters this situation through a self-protective mechanism - a
penalty mechanism.
We carry out experiments and present experimental results. The experimental results show
system performance is policy-dependent. In other words, we have opportunities to design and
develop policies carefully to make the system work efficiently. Our system was examined using
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simulated workload instead of real email workload; however, we should analyze our system in terms
of email clients or email servers in the Internet environment.
Our approach is not a complete spam control solution, but it is a supplement to existing ap-
proaches. Combined with other approaches, such as filter-based approaches or market-based ap-
proaches, our approach will work more effectively.
6.2 Future Work
This work creates a new approach for message admission control. In our prototype implementation,
we do not consider one important issue - the security issue. However, to be deployed practically,
the security issue must be addressed. Our future work should focus on solving the most infamous
attack - Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Furthermore, because negotiation and communication in-
volve eCash and contracts, malicious attackers may make our system work ineffectively through
fabricating false eCash and false contracts. The new future implementation must add an authenti-
cation mechanism to resolve this problem as well.
We introduce a group, which is analogous with an organization in human society. Through
groups, we may do more interesting researches on “many-to-one” and “many-to-many” communi-
cation mechanisms in the future.
In Chapter 3, we introduce a satellite, which is a proxy of a cell. In the future, we will introduce
a satellite of a group, which encapsulates satellites of its group members.
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